

MUNEA'26



Study Guide

H-NATO

Agenda Item:
Preventing Political and Military Instability in
Eastern Europe in the Immediate Post-Cold
War Period (1991-1993)

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ROME SUMMIT 1991

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1. Letters

1.1. Letter from the Secretary-General

Esteemed Participants;

My name is Mustafa Gürmeriç and I am serving as the Secretary General of MUNEA'26. It is a great honour to welcome you all to the 2nd edition of Ankara Erman Ilıcak Science High School's Model United Nations Conference, MUNEA'26.

This conference means a lot to me, not just because I helped organize it, but because I began my MUN career in 9th grade with MUNER'24, our school's mock MUN. Since then, I've continued to participate in conferences, and I've finally come back to where I started but this time not as a delegate, but as someone organizing it. This entire process has not only taught me a great deal but has also been a significant experience that has shaped who I am today.

As the MUNEA'26 community, we have dedicated ourselves fully to this process and worked tirelessly to bring you one of the best conferences possible. And I cannot conclude without thanking the entire academic community and the organizing team, especially my colleagues on the executive team for their contributions to this process.

And finally, dear delegates, I would like to thank you for joining us on this journey; it would not be complete without you. I hope you come to your committees well prepared and enjoy three days that are as academic and fun as possible. I look forward to seeing you all at our school from May 22–24. Debate. Collaborate. Make a Change.

Sincerely,

Mustafa Gürmeriç

Secretary General of MUNEA'26

1.2. Letter from the Under Secretary-General

Esteemed Participants of MUNEA'26,

I am Neva Özkul, a student at Ankara Social Sciences High School, and it is my utmost pleasure to serve as the Under Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

I am truly grateful to bring the real procedure of NATO to life once again in this conference. With this conference you will experience one of the most realistic versions of NATO in Model United Nations conferences. Through diplomacy, negotiations, crisis management and decision making processes you will face the political and military uncertainty that followed the end of the Cold War.

In this committee we will relive the 1991 Rome Summit, you will represent ambassadors, presidents, chancellors and prime ministers of NATO members. Your goal will be to debate the future of NATO while addressing instability in Eastern Europe. I strongly encourage delegates to research not only their country's policies, but also the fears, limitations, and ambitions that shaped Europe in the early 1990s. Strong diplomacy, realistic policymaking, and active participation will define success in this committee.

I recommend you read the study guide and RoP carefully before the conference,

My personal advice on how to read it:

Briefly view "Introduction to the Committee"

Know the "Historical Context", all the parts between 4.3.2 to 4.3.6

Have an idea of "NATO's Institutional Position", "NATO's Responses" and "Case Studies"

You can view the entire 4.3.1 clause and sub clauses of it as extra information.

Lastly, I'd like to express my sincere gratitude to a few people, first Ali Batuhan Taçbaşı, although he is not attending this conference he is the most important person in my life, I thank him for existing. My Academic Assistant Fehmi for assisting me on the guide. I thank the entire executive team and all my friends whom I did not list, you know I appreciate every one of you.

I would also like to express my complete confidence in our chairboard team, whose dedication and preparation have made the development of this committee possible. Their commitment to realism, procedural quality, and dynamic crisis progression will ensure an unforgettable experience for all participants.

If you have any questions regarding the committee or the, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Best Regards,

Neva Özkul

Under-Secretary-General of NATO

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1.3. Letter from the Academic Assistant

Dear Delegates;

My name is Fehmi Efe Arslan, studying at Ankara Atatürk High School, serving as your Academic Assistant for this committee. It is a great honor and pleasure to serve as the ACAS of this committee.

I have a short list of thanks. First of all my dear friend, the Secretariat of this committee: , Neva Özkul. After than that, I would like to thank the Executive Board, for their precious invitation and efforts that put on this conference.

And last but not least, I would like to thank my whole MUNAAL family

And lastly, if you have any inquiries upon the committee, study guide, rules of procedure or any other else, do not hesitate to contact with me.

Best Regards,

Fehmi Efe Arslan,

ACAS of H-NATO

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2. Introduction to the Committee

2.1. NATO's Definition and Authority

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is made up of 32, 30 European, and 2 North American countries. The organization was created following World War II to carry out the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington, D.C. (What is NATO, 2001) NATO is a system of collective security in which the independent member states agree to defend one another from outside an assault. During the Cold War, NATO acted

as a deterrent to the Soviet Union's threat. The alliance continued after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, participating in military actions in South Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans. The organization's motto is "*animus in consulendo liber*"¹ (Latin for "a mind unfettered in deliberation").

NATO's military headquarters are in Mons, Belgium, while its major administrative offices are in Brussels, Belgium. The deployment of the NATO Response Force in Eastern Europe has been prioritized by the alliance, and the total military strength of all NATO countries is around 3.5 million soldiers. By 2022, their combined military spending accounted for about 55% of the nominal world total. Furthermore, members have committed to achieving or maintaining a target defense spending level of at least 2% of GDP by 2024. (The Wales Declaration on the Transatlantic Bond)

On April 4, 1947, NATO was founded with twelve founding members. Since then, the organization has recruited nine more members, the most recent being Finland on April 4, 2023, 74 years after NATO was founded. When Sweden's application for membership is granted in June 2022, it will become the 32nd member of the North Atlantic Treaty, as the existing nations have now ratified its Accession Protocol. (REUTERS, 2023) Additionally, NATO recognizes Ukraine, Georgia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina as potential members. Non-member Russia, one of the twenty extra nations participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace program, has heightened relations. An additional 19 nations are involved in NATO's structured conversation projects. (What is NATO, 2001)

¹ *Animus in consulendo liber* is the official motto of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is inspired by the work "The Catiline Conspiracy" by the Roman historian Sallustius.

The fundamental principle of NATO is expressed in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that:

“an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

Article 5 has only been invoked once in response to the 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001.

In order to solve issues, build trust, and ultimately prevent conflict, NATO encourages democratic ideas and allows members to communicate and work together on military and security issues. (What is NATO, 2001)

NATO is committed to settling conflicts peacefully. It has the military potential to carry out crisis-management operations if diplomatic efforts are unsuccessful. These are carried out, either alone or jointly with other nations and international organizations, in accordance with the collective defense clause of the Washington Treaty, the founding treaty of NATO.

2.2. History of NATO

British diplomacy laid the groundwork for NATO in the early aftermath of World War II in an effort to restrain the Soviet Union and prevent its dominance from extending throughout Europe (What is NATO, 2001). The Treaty of Dunkirk, signed by the United Kingdom and France in 1947, was a defense pact that was enlarged in 1948 with the signing of the Treaty of Brussels to include the three Benelux states (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). This pact pledged the participants to fifty years of collective defense against an armed attack. The British worked with Washington in 1949 to extend the alliance into NATO, which included the United States, Canada, Italy, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. Spain joined in 1982, following West Germany.

Over the course of the Cold War and its aftermath, NATO's structure evolved. When it became clear that NATO's defenses against a potential Soviet invasion would need to be strengthened over time, the integrated military organization of NATO was established in 1950.

Due to considerable standardization brought about by NATO's founding in terms of allied military terminology, protocols, and technology, European nations frequently adopted US tactics. Numerous NATO standard operating procedures were codified in about 1300 Standardization Agreements (STANAG). As a result, in the 1950s, a number of NATO countries made the 7.6251mm NATO rifle cartridge their standard ammunition.⁷⁵ nations, several outside of NATO, adopted the FAL from Fabrique Nationale de Herstal, which used the NATO 7.62mm cartridge (NATO, 1956). Any NATO aircraft can now land at any NATO

base thanks to the standardization of aircraft marshaling signals. Other standards, like the NATO phonetic alphabet, have entered civilian use in addition to the military.

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 was critical for NATO because it demonstrated the evident risk of all Communist nations cooperating and compelled the organization to develop actual military measures. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was established in January 1951 to command forces in Europe under Supreme Allied Commander Dwight Eisenhower (Ismay, 1954). In order to combat the Soviet Union, the North Atlantic Council convened in Lisbon in February 1952 with the same uncompromising position that the NATO Military Committee called for in September 1950.

There were some heated negotiations, particularly between the United States and the United Kingdom, regarding how to include both nations in the military command structure after Greece and Turkey joined the alliance in 1952. While the clear military preparations were ongoing, the Western European Union launched covert operations like Operation Gladio to sustain resistance after a successful Soviet invasion. The NATO Tiger Association and competitions like the Canadian Army Trophy for tank gunnery contributed to the development of an informal alliance amongst NATO's armed forces.

The Soviet Union suggested NATO membership in 1954 in order to maintain peace in Europe. NATO states ultimately rejected the notion because of concern that the Soviet Union's goal was to destabilize the union (CBC News, 2009). On December 17, 1954, the North Atlantic Council approved MC 48, a key document in the development of NATO

nuclear thought. If the Soviet Union decides to use nuclear weapons first, MC 48 emphasized that NATO must use them from the beginning of a conflict with the Soviet Union. This gave SACEUR the same automatic right to use nuclear weapons as the US Strategic Air Command's commander-in-chief.

The admission of West Germany to the group on May 9, 1955, was welcomed by then-Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange as "a decisive turning point in the history of our continent." A crucial aspect of defense was that it would require German effort to prepare sufficient conventional forces to repel a Soviet invasion. The Warsaw Pact, which was confirmed on May 14, 1955, by the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and East Germany, was one of the direct consequences of West Germany's affiliation.

NATO's unity was tested early in its history, while France's Charles de Gaulle was president. De Gaulle was critical of the United States' strong engagement in NATO and its particular connection with the United Kingdom (Garret, 2011). On September 17, 1958, he called for the establishment of a tripartite directorate in communication with US President Dwight Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. This would have put France on an equal footing with the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Warsaw Pact and the Mediterranean Fleet were two key ideas in the Cold War. The US withdrew 300 military aircraft from France and regained control of the air force stations that had been run in France since 1950 after France removed its Mediterranean Fleet from NATO

command and forbade foreign nuclear weapons from being stationed on French soil. In 1966, France removed its armed forces from NATO's combined military command, prompting SHAPE to move from Rocquencourt to Casteau, Belgium. France vowed to protect Europe in the event of a potential Warsaw Pact invasion and continued to be a member of NATO. During the Strasbourg-Kehl summit in 2009, France declared its return to full membership. (NATO, 2010)

Ministers approved the deployment of US GLCM cruise missiles and Pershing II theater nuclear weapons in Europe on December 12, 1979, in order to enhance the Western negotiation position on nuclear disarmament. NATO deployed additional Pershing II missiles in 1983 and 1984, with the goal of targeting military targets such as tank formations in the event of a confrontation. The Western European peace movement condemned this operation, and support for its deployment declined. During that time, the group's membership remained largely stable. Greece separated its military from NATO's military command organization in 1974, but it rejoined in 1980. (Trakimavičius, 2018)

NATO did not intervene in the conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the Falkland Islands. Spain joined the alliance on May 30, 1982, after a referendum in 1986 confirmed it. At the pinnacle of the Cold War, 16 member countries maintained an estimated active military strength of 5,252,800, including up to 435,000 forward-deployed US forces, under a command structure that reached a peak of 78 headquarters organized into four echelons. (Weinrod & Barry, 2010)

The 1989 Revolutions and the Warsaw Pact's dissolution in 1991 withdrew NATO's de facto principal foe, which prompted a strategic reevaluation of NATO's objectives, tasks, and concentration on Europe. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which NATO and the Soviet Union agreed in Paris in 1990, required a decrease in military power throughout the continent. Up to the Soviet Union's disintegration in December 1991, the transition was ongoing. At the time, European countries contributed 34% of NATO's military budget; by 2012, that number had decreased to 21% (Harding, 2007). Along with intensifying its attention on political and humanitarian concerns, NATO also began a slow expansion into countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Following the Federal Republic of Germany's reunification on October 3, 1990, NATO expanded as the former East Germany merged with the Federal Republic of Germany. Although opinions on whether or not negotiators made any informal agreements on potential NATO expansion, there was no written commitment in the agreement not to extend NATO to the east. Declassified documents reveal that Soviet negotiators thought NATO membership for nations like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Poland was out of the question. Jack Matlock, the American ambassador to the Soviet Union in its final years, claimed that the West made a "clear commitment" not to enlarge.

In a talk with Eduard Shevardnadze, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said, *"For us, however, one thing is certain: NATO will not expand to the east. The subject of 'NATO expansion' was not discussed at all, and it was not brought up in those years,"* (Shifrinson, 2016) Gorbachev claimed. No NATO member accepted the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, according to Robert Zoellick, a US State

Department official involved in the Two Plus Four negotiating process. The treaty was signed by 30 countries in 1999 and approved by Russia in 2000.

France was restored to full membership on April 4, 2009, as a result of the initiatives of French President Nicolas Sarkozy. This included France rejoining the NATO Military Command Structure while maintaining a standalone nuclear deterrent. (NATO, 2010)

Three former communist countries Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland were invited to join NATO on July 8, 1997²; all three agreed, with Hungary's acceptance being supported by a referendum in which 85.3% of participants supported joining NATO. (Perez, 1999)

With the inclusion of seven additional Central and Eastern European nations Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania NATO membership increased even further. At the 2002 Prague summit, they were asked to start membership talks, and on March 29, 2004, right before the 2004 Istanbul summit, they joined NATO. In a vote, Slovenian membership was accepted with 66.02% of the vote. It is significant that Romania joined NATO because it provides NATO control over the vital Focșani Gate.

On June 5, 2017, Montenegro joined NATO as its 29th member, amid strong objections from Russia. On March 27, 2020, a name dispute with Greece was resolved, and North Macedonia became recognized as the 30th member. (MILIC, 2017)

Both Sweden and Finland submitted membership applications in June 2022; Finland became a member in April 2023, and Sweden's application is now being acknowledged by the existing members.

² This can be cited as a clear example of NATO's stance after the 1990 London Summit.

2.2.1. Founding Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

After World War II, Belgium restored its economy in a very short time and this situation created an opportunity for Belgium to shift its defense and foreign policies with its neighbors. The Benelux Customs Union, which removed tariffs between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. On 17 March 1948, Belgium adopted the Brussels Treaty and it strengthened the relationships between Western European Countries. On 4 April 1949, Belgium signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C.

Canada was one of the few countries with an undamaged economy and a strong army after World War II. After witnessing the rise of the Soviet Union, Canada entered into negotiations for a transatlantic collective security alliance. Canada thought that this alliance should be more than just a military pact, it should improve the bonds between the members of it in a lot of ways like economic and cultural. Canadian negotiators helped write the 14 articles of NATO and on 4 April 1949, Canada signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C.

In the years of World War II, Denmark was a neutral country. However, in 1949, the Danish Parliament voted largely in support of NATO membership. Considering the geopolitical position, Denmark was a strategic giant. Denmark was a key strategic ally for the Western Allies. In the sequel of the decision that the Danish Parliament had made, on 4 April 1949, Denmark signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C.

In the aftermath of World War II, France was a strong believer in a Western defense structure and was one of the founding members of the Alliance. Furthermore, France adopted the Brussels Treaty in 1948 and took a big step to improve its relationships with the neighbors and Western Allies. France signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C. on 4 April 1949.

Iceland was not a part of World War II and a neutral country without an army until the United States occupied it. After the war, the United States offered to lease three bases in Iceland but this offer had declined. Iceland had a very difficult process about NATO membership because Iceland was proud of its pacifist and neutral traditions and after the voting in the Parliament of Iceland some protest emerged in the capital city of Iceland, Reykjavík. After this tough process, Iceland formally joined NATO by signing the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949.

There were a lot of lengthy and long standing domestic debates and dissensions about the membership of NATO in Italy. Italy's position in the Mediterranean Sea could help NATO in the way of defending the Southern Flank. Also, in Italy, the government is Communist Party and by the membership of NATO, member countries could demonstrate the importance of democracy, freedom and individual rights. In this period of time, Italy sent confounding responses to NATO under the influence of Communist Party. In 1948, Christian Democrats won the election and Christian Democrats were determined for Italy's membership in NATO. On 4 April 1949, Italy signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C. and became a founding member of NATO.

Luxembourg was a country of neutrality and isolationism. In World War II, Nazi Germany invaded and occupied Luxembourg in 1940. In these years of invasion and occupation, Luxembourg signed the Benelux Agreement with Belgium and the Netherlands on the purpose of improving its economy. On 10 September 1944, Luxembourg is liberated by the US army and Nazis were pushed back. After that, in 1948, Luxembourg became a part of Western Union and hardened its relationships with European and Western countries. On 4 April 1949, Luxembourg became a NATO member by signing the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C.

Contrary to its neighbors, Belgium and Luxembourg, Netherlands had been devastated and faced the major part of reconstruction in the war. On 10 May 1940, Nazi Germany invaded the Netherlands and the Dutch Cabinet left the country to move England to stay safe. England; Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium improved their relationships and they supported the Western European Unity. The Netherlands signed the Benelux Agreement with Luxembourg and Belgium. After that, the Netherlands emphasized and actively contributed to the creation of Western Union and signed the Brussels Pact in 1948. In 1949, the Dutch East Indies declared independence and became Indonesia. On 4 April 1949, Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C. and the Netherlands formally became a member of NATO.

Trygve Lie, a Norwegian politician was convinced of the need for a new transatlantic security organization which should include the US, the UK and Norway. At the end of

World War II, there was an opportunity for Norway, “the Nordic Option”. In 1948; Sweden, Denmark and Norway met and discussed this idea however, they found this idea was not enough for Soviet aggression. Also, the Norwegian politicians thought that a potential Nordic block could only stand with the support of the US and the Western Europe. Considering all of these situations, Norway decided to join the North Atlantic Alliance and on April 4, 1949, Norway signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C. and became a member of NATO.

Portugal had centuries-long relations with the United Kingdom, they helped each other in their tough times, and they had some privileged trade agreements. After that, Portugal was invited to join the North Atlantic Alliance, but Portugal had some concerns about possible exploitations about their naval and air bases, but the Alliance ensured that these resources would not be used without the government’s full consent. On April 4 1949, Portugal signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C. and became a member of NATO.

The United Kingdom was an Island Empire with a lot of colonies all over the world. The UK's defense mostly relied on traditional maritime strategy. The control of the seas was vital in protecting its territories and supporting its alliances. However, in World War II, a big necessity of land forces had emerged, and the UK had to maintain its land forces against Nazi Germany. Furthermore, the economy of the UK had been devastated by the war. After facing these challenges, the UK thought that Europe should be ready and prepared to defend themselves for any possible wars in the future and they should unite to reduce the risk of any possible wars. In 1948, the UK signed the Brussels Pact for these purposes. Afterwards, the

UK signed the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 in Washington D.C. and became a member of NATO.

After World War II, America was a superpower with a strong army and a golden economy. Despite the fact that America had a policy of isolationism, the country would aid all “free people” being subjugated, and America started with financial aid for Turkey and Greece to protect them from the possible communist threats. Then, the US launched “the Marshall Plan”, officially known as “the European Recovery Program” to recover and reconstruct the damaged European economies. In 1948, the US started secret talks with Canada and Britain about forming the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty. After significant events in Europe such as the Berlin Blockade and the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, America introduced itself as the future of Europe and signed the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4 1949 in Washington D.C and became a founding member of NATO.

2.2.2. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1990

Countries that were members of NATO before 1990 and joined NATO, excluding the NATO founding countries, and related information are shown below.

There were some fears and concerns about the communist expansion throughout Europe and the other parts of the world and security at Southeastern Europe was vital to prevent the possible spread of communism. For this very reason, membership of Greece is essential for NATO because if Greece was a member of NATO, the alliance’s southern flank would have been strengthened. Consequently, on February 18, 1952, Greece joined NATO.


Straddling two continents, with a foot both in Europe and Asia, Türkiye is a key point for connecting up the Middle East, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia together. As a consequence of this, Türkiye's possible membership of NATO is beneficial for the Alliance. Immediately before the Cold War, Europe divided into 2 blocs: the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc. Turkey chose to side with Western powers. This policy led Turkey to its membership of NATO on February 18, 1952.

After World War II, ways of integrating the Federal Republic of Germany into west European defense structures was a priority for the Alliance. Western leaders and their population opposed any form of rearmament for a long time but it is obvious that Europe had to have more troops in order to form a credible deterrent and protect West Germany from the communist influence. Initially, France proposed the creation of a European Defense Community however, the French senate opposed the plan and NATO membership of Germany had remained as the only solution to this problem. To make this membership possible, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union had to end their invasion and occupation of the Federal Republic of Germany; Italy and West Germany needed to be admitted to the Western Union Defense Organization. Subsequently, Germany joined the Western Union and occupied country status of the Federal Republic of Germany's had terminated brought Germany closer to its membership of NATO. On 6 May 1955, Germany became NATO's 15th member country.

In 1982, Spain was already a part of the international community through its membership of the United Nations, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

In 1975 and in the following years, the country opened itself up to Euro-Atlantic affairs. In 1981, a military coup happened, and Socialist Party was raised in Spain. Socialist government was initially against NATO membership and this situation created a difficult social and political context, both nationally and internationally. However, on 30 May 1982, Spain joined the Alliance despite considerable public opposition.

2.3. Principal Bodies of NATO



*U.S. Navy. (1952). 1952 organizational chart of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) [Organizational Chart]. U.S. Navy All Hands Magazine, p. 31.*³

2.3.1. North Atlantic Council (NAC)

North Atlantic Council (NAC), apart from being the highest decision-making organization of NATO, is effectively a backbone for NATO's decision complements, and also draws up NATO's political and strategic policy. All the alliance member states have their representatives in the council, and all the follow-on decisions of NATO are taken here. It speaks in weekly meetings⁴ concerning how the international alliance will react to aggressive

³ https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1952_NATO_organizational_chart.jpg

⁴ The NAC meets at least every week and often more frequently, at the level of Permanent Representatives; it usually meets twice a year at the level of ministers of foreign affairs, three times a year at the level of ministers of defence, and occasionally at summit level with the participation of heads of state and government." (Nato, n.d.)

postures emanating from the Russia bloc and social aggressions to present threats to security and steps to be taken during times of potential crisis. NAC likewise discusses NATO expansionist policy, military tactics and collective defense roles. Decisions to be made along the process are voted unanimously, which implies that NAC is democratic in theory. The decisions of the NAC have to be followed by all NATO members, and thus, the council plays a prominent role in NATO's political and military operations, as well as maintaining the alliance stable.

2.3.2. Allied Command Operations (ACO)

The Allied Operations Command (ACO), which plans and conducts NATO's military operations, is always ready to respond quickly and effectively to international security threats. Additionally, it manages the resources required for military missions, brings together allied countries to organize NATO military exercises, and develops joint training programs to enhance the military capabilities of member countries. This command is of great importance for NATO's military future and the maintenance of international peace.

2.3.3. Allied Command Transformation (ACT)

The Allied Transformation Command (ACT), responsible for enhancing NATO's future military capacity, also works on the alliance's modernization, integration of new technologies, and management of education programs. This command develops strategic plans to improve NATO's military structure and proposes innovative solutions, and increases the military skills and cooperation potential of the allies by organizing NATO's joint education programs and exercises. By promoting military cooperation among member countries, this command contributes to NATO's adaptation to the global security

environment. The work of this command is of great importance in terms of developing NATO's defense strategies and increasing the effectiveness of the alliance.

2.3.4. Defense Planning Committee (DPC)

The Defense Planning Committee (DPC), created in 1963, was one of the main decision making bodies of NATO tasked with coordinating defense planning for the Alliance, military preparation, and force development. The Committee was primarily created with the aim of centralizing defense related issues among the remaining member countries after France's exclusion from NATO's integrated defense structure. Consisting of all Allies except France, the DPC offered political advice to the Military Committee, maintained oversight of collective defense capabilities, synchronized national defense contributions to NATO's strategic goals, and maintained cohesion in the Alliance's military posture by endorsing plans of operation during times of emergency. Though it was eliminated in 2010 and its mandate returned to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the DPC significantly contributed to the establishment of NATO's current defense planning system and paved the way for member countries to reconcile national policies with collective goals of security.

3. Cabinets of the Committee

3.1. NATO Summit

NATO summit meetings provide periodic opportunities for the Heads of State and Government of NATO member countries to discuss important issues facing the Alliance and provide strategic direction for its activities. NATO summits, with their backroom meetings between presidents and ministers, are the summits where decisions are drawn up by the NAC, the signing of the final document, the Communique, press releases, and NATO's milestones are determined. Press briefings frequently take place at NATO summits.

3.2. North Atlantic Council (NAC)

The North Atlantic Council is the principal political decision-making body within NATO. It oversees the political and military processes related to security issues affecting the entire Alliance. During NAC summits, it prepares final documents for heads of state, submits amendments to written documents, makes revisions, and handles background checks at NATO summits. NAC sessions are generally closed to the press.

4. Introduction to the Agenda Item

4.1. Historical Context

4.1.1. The End of the Cold War

The Cold War (1947-1991) was a systematic confrontation between the United States of America, NATO and The Soviet Union with the Warsaw Pact. America played the role of liberal capitalists and the Soviets with the Warsaw Pact being Marxist-Leninist communists. The conflict mainly was fought through ideological competition, direct warfare between the two sides have never escalated however economic pressure, arms races, proxy wars, as well as technological, espionage and intelligence competition were seen to have raised tension

between the two sides. By the late 70s-80s, the Cold War intensified with the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union alongside the tensions in Europe, these tensions resulted in severe structural weaknesses causing the entire system to need to adapt into the newer settings.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States, then, wanted security after 1945, but each defined it in a different way. The Soviet Union was still a regional power after 1945 and security for it meant 'friendly' states on its border. The United States was a global economic power and security for it meant a world open to the free exchange of goods, money and people.' (Mason, 2002, 2)

The Soviet economy which relied mostly on industrial productivity suffered due to technological setbacks as well as huge military spendings on military resulting into civilian investment being prevented, due to the same issues agricultural failures requiring imported grain were also seen by the 1980s the Soviets who were in an arms race with USA were spending about 15-16 percent of their GDP on the military which was un sustainable compared to USA which was spending about 5 to 9 percent of their GDP. This was mostly due to Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative in 1983 though it was unrealistic it forced the USSR to consider spending more and more of their budget on military which eventually they could not afford.

Another example of this, another reason on the economic collapse of USSR was the cost of the Afghan War (1979-1989) which is often called the Soviet Vietnam where the USSR lost thousands of troops as well as vast amounts of dollars which essentially demoralized the

Soviet military and damaged the reputation of communism, exposing Soviet limits and accelerated their decline.

The communist ideology by the 1980s was suffering due to the condition of the Soviet Union resulting in even the communist elites feeling the system was not sustainable, corruption, lack of political freedom as well as dissident movements in Eastern Europe were mostly the causes of the communist system failing to continue strong in the region.

The Cold War was a geopolitical conflict between the Western and Eastern Blocs, as well as the respective allies of the United States and the Soviet Union. The term "cold war" relates to the fact that the two superpowers supported opposing forces in significant regional conflicts known as "proxy wars," as opposed to engaging in large-scale combat. Following their short alliance and victory over Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany in 1945, these two countries were involved in a geopolitical and ideological war for world dominance. The struggle for supremacy was indirectly expressed through psychological warfare, propaganda campaigns, espionage, extensive embargoes, rivalry at sporting events, and technological competitions like the Space Race in addition to the development of nuclear arsenals and the deployment of conventional military forces.

The Western Bloc was headed by the United regimes and a few other First World countries, the majority of which were former European colonies and had liberal democratic governments in general, while they were occasionally connected to a network of Third World authoritarian regimes. The Eastern Bloc, which held sway throughout World War II and was connected to a web of authoritarian countries, was led by the Soviet Union and its Communist Party. On its satellite nations, the Soviet Union imposed authoritarian regimes

and ran a command economy. The US government supported anti-communist and right-wing governments and movements, whereas the Soviet Union supported left-wing parties and revolutions all over the world. Almost all colonial governments attained independence between 1945 and 1960, and some of them turned into Third World battlegrounds.

After World War II concluded in 1945, the Cold War's initial phase started. The United States and its Western European allies attempted to strengthen their ties and implement a containment strategy against Soviet penetration with the foundation of NATO in 1949. The Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union's response, had a comparable impact on the Eastern Bloc in 1955. The Warsaw Pact's primary goal, despite its outward appearance as a "defensive" alliance, was to keep the Soviet Union in charge of its satellites in Eastern Europe. The Pact only engaged in direct military action by attacking its own members to stop them from seceding. To keep East Berliners from emigrating to democratic, affluent West Berlin, Soviet-dominated East Germany constructed the Berlin Wall in 1961.

A new era dawned with the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Sino-Soviet schism exacerbated ties inside the communist realm and resulted in a series of border clashes, while France, a Western Bloc power, began to advocate for more autonomy. While the civil rights movement and resistance to the Vietnam War divided the United States, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 to put an end to the Prague Spring. In the 1960s and 1970s, a worldwide peace movement gained appeal among individuals all over the world. Significant anti-war demonstrations have taken place, as have rallies against nuclear weapon testing and in favor of nuclear disarmament. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the creation of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China as a strategic

counterbalance to the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a period of détente in the 1970s, when both sides had started to make preparations for peace and security. Several self-declared Marxist-Leninist governments appeared in developing countries in the second half of the 1970s, including those in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua.

The Soviet-Afghan War broke out towards the conclusion of the decade, in 1979, thus ending détente. Another phase of violent strife occurred in the early 1980s. When the United States placed diplomatic, military, and economic pressures on the Soviet Union, it was already in a state of economic stagnation. Mikhail Gorbachev, the new Soviet leader, launched the liberalizing glasnost and perestroika policies in the mid-1980s and terminated Soviet participation in Afghanistan in 1989. Gorbachev chose not to continue militarily supporting communist nations in response to mounting aspirations for national sovereignty across Eastern Europe.

With the breakdown of the Iron Curtain following the Pan-European Picnic in 1989, nearly all of the Marxist-Leninist governments in the Eastern Bloc were deposed. After a failed coup attempt in August 1991, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union lost power and was outlawed. This resulted in the Soviet Union's formal disintegration in December 1991, as well as the toppling of communist governments throughout much of Africa and Asia. The other republics survived the breakup of the Soviet Union as completely independent post-Soviet governments, while the Russian Federation took its place. The United States is the world's last surviving superpower.

The events of the Cold War left an indelible mark. It is commonly used in popular culture, particularly when addressing espionage and the threat of nuclear war. See *International Relations Since 1989* for further details.

4.1.2. Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact

The Warsaw Pact was a military alliance led by the Soviet Union which was made off of Eastern Bloc countries. Its decline was not sudden but progressed over the years due to political, economic and ideological breakdowns in the USSR and its satellite states.

Eastern countries were far behind Europe regarding their economies, they could not reach the technological advancements with military spending being high the issue became much deeper. With regional peace becoming much lower day by day they started losing legitimacy as people viewed communist governments as corrupt, the Soviet model lost appeal.

Considering all with the rise of nationalism, countries that were previously under Soviet control wanted their own independence like Poland and Hungary. With the Solidarity Movement in 1980 in Poland it became much clearer that the Soviets could not control internal politics any more. And with Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania all leaving Soviet control in 1989 they all almost completely abandoned communism. Meaning the Pact became meaningless.



Daily Times. (2021, May 14). This day in history | 1955 communist states sign Warsaw Pact.

*MacauDailyTimes.*⁵

Out of fear of a rearmed Germany, Czechoslovak officials envisioned a security alliance with Poland and East Germany prior to the formation of the Warsaw alliance. These countries were outspoken in their opposition to West Germany's remilitarization. The Warsaw Pact was formed as a response to West Germany's rearmament inside NATO. Soviet authorities, like many European politicians on both sides of the Iron Curtain, were concerned about Germany regaining its reputation as a military force and a direct danger. The Soviets and Eastern Europeans were still acutely aware of Germany's militarism's consequences. Given that the Soviet Union already had an army presence and political control over its eastern satellite republics by 1955, the accord was long viewed as "superfluous," and NATO diplomats referred to it as a "cardboard castle" owing to the haste with which it was constructed.

5

<https://macaudailytimes.com.mo/this-day-in-history-1955-communist-states-sign-warsaw-pact-3.html>

In 1954, the USSR suggested joining NATO due to worries about the rise of German militarism in West Germany, but the US rejected the proposal. The Soviet Union's proposal for NATO membership was the result of the Berlin Conference, which took place in January and February 1954. Molotov's offers to unify Germany and organize elections for a pan-German government in exchange for army withdrawal from the four nations and German neutrality were rejected by the other foreign ministers, Dulles (USA), Eden (UK), and Bidault. The notion of unifying Germany had been discussed previously; however, negotiations about it came to a stop on March 20, 1952, when the United Kingdom, France, and the United States demanded that a unified Germany should not be neutral and should be free to join the European Defense Community (EDC) and rearm.

The goal should be to avoid interacting with the Russians and to promote the European Defense Community, according to James Dunn (USA), who met with Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, and Eden in Paris. According to historian Rolf Steininger, Adenauer's belief that "neutralization means sovietization," referring to the Soviet Union's finlandization policies toward Finland, was the primary factor in the rejection of Soviet proposals, whereas historian John Gaddis asserts that "there was little inclination in Western capitals to explore this offer." Adenauer also thought that the CDU's political hegemony in the West German Bundestag would have been ended by German unification.

As a result, Molotov proposed a General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe, which would have included a united Germany and rendered the EDC obsolete, out of fear that it would one day be directed against the USSR and "seeking to prevent the formation of

groups of European States directed against the other European States." On the other side, Eden, Dulles, and Bidault were against the idea.

One month later, opponents in Western nations (including Gaston Palewski, the leader of the French Gaullists) joined EDC backers in rejecting the proposed European Treaty, saying that it was "unacceptable in its current form because it excludes the United States from participation in Europe's collective security system." In order to convince the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France to support the United States' participation in the envisioned General European Agreement, the Soviets decided to undertake a new strategy.

The Soviets opted to declare their "readiness to examine jointly with other interested parties the question of the USSR's participation in the North Atlantic bloc," claiming that "the admission of the USA into the General European Agreement should not be conditional on the three Western powers." This was offered as yet another counter-argument to the Soviet proposition.

The governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, and France swiftly rejected all proposals, including the wish to join NATO. Take the position of British General Hastings Ismay, a fervent supporter of NATO expansion, as an illustration. In 1954, he rejected the Soviet Union's application to join NATO, saying it was "like an unrepentant burglar asking to join the police force."

Adenauer made his first trip to the United States in April 1954, when he met Nixon, Eisenhower, and Dulles. Although the EDC's ratification was delayed, US officials made it plain to Adenauer that the EDC would have to join NATO.

The Nazi occupation was still fresh in people's minds, and France shared their fear of Germany's rearmament. The French Parliament rejected the EDC on August 30, 1954, guaranteeing its failure and thwarting a key objective of US policy in Europe: to militarily integrate West Germany with the West. The US Department of State started to investigate possibilities, such as encouraging West Germany to join NATO or, in the case of French obstructionism, employing strategies to get over a French veto to obtain German rearmament outside of NATO.

On October 23, 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany was authorized to join the North Atlantic Pact. West Germany's accession to the group on May 9 was greeted by Norway's foreign minister at the time, Halvard Lange, as "a decisive turning point in the history of our continent." The Soviet Union requested a new European Security Treaty in November 1954, but it was rejected in order to prevent a remilitarized West Germany from being hostile to the Soviet Union.

By "reaffirming their desire for the establishment of a system of European collective security based on the participation of all European states irrespective of their social and political

systems," the USSR and seven other Eastern European nations created the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955, in response to the Federal Republic of Germany's integration into NATO.

The Soviet Union permitted East Germany, one of the founding members, to re-arm, and the National People's Army was founded to counter West Germany's rearmament.

The Soviet Union focused on its own recovery, seizing, and transferring the majority of Germany's industrial plants and demanding war reparations from East Germany, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria via Soviet-dominated joint enterprises. It also negotiated trade treaties that were specifically tailored to the country's needs.

Moscow exerted control over and issued directives to the Communist parties in charge of the satellite governments. According to historian Mark Kramer, "there was a net outflow of resources from eastern Europe to the Soviet Union in the first decade after World War II, amounting to \$15 billion to \$20 billion, roughly equal to the total assistance provided by the United States to western Europe under the Marshall Plan."

The Warsaw Pact nation of Hungary was invaded by the Soviet Union in November 1956, ending the Hungarian Revolution forcefully. In order to ensure the stationing of Soviet forces in these countries, the USSR subsequently signed bilateral 20-year agreements with Poland, the GDR, Romania, and Hungary.

4.1.3. Dissolution of the Soviet Union

With Gorbachev's coming to power in the Soviet Union, 2 reforms working with each other came to the table. These being Гласность (Glasnost) meaning transparency and Перестройка (Perestroika) meaning construction.

With these reforms the Soviet Union aimed to widen opposition among the Soviet people to policies that would re-establish capitalism. In conclusion, the Soviets' new transparency policy ended up allowing freedom of speech and revealed past crimes of Stalin, this made it so that minorities saw even further how they were oppressed, Baltic states brought up Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact⁶ causing more demand for independence.

On the other hand Perestroika was more related to economic reforms, previously USSR's economy was purely tied to its government, Moscow decided for every factory, there was no competition and workers were paid even if they underperformed, factories were fulfilling quotas not quality. Gorbachev planned to fix this by mixing market elements with previous policies. Gorbachev allowed factories to have autonomy over certain decisions as well as partially being able to decide their prices, small businesses were legalized, foreign investments were allowed in order to bring western technology to the country, agricultural reforms that allowed leasing for personal farming tried to reduce collective farm inefficiency.

⁶ On the night of August 23-24, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The countries agreed not to attack each other and secretly divided the remaining territories between them. Germany claimed Western Poland and parts of Lithuania. The Soviet Union would occupy Eastern Poland, the Baltic States, and parts of Finland. A week later, Germany invaded Poland, and two weeks after that, the Soviet Union attacked Poland from the east.

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Late Edition

New York: Today, clear, mild for the season. High 44. Tonight, cloudy late, breezy. Low 34. Tomorrow, cloudy, then colder, windy. High 45. Yesterday, high 46, low 38. Details, page D12.

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GORBACHEV, LAST SOVIET LEADER, RESIGNS; U.S. RECOGNIZES REPUBLICS' INDEPENDENCE

RETAILERS REPORT SALES FELL SHORT OF DIM FORECASTS

Last-Minute Buying Spree Fails
to Carry Merchants Ahead
of Last Year's Receipts

By EBEN SHAPIRO

Retailers would probably like to forget Christmas 1991. While most merchants had been prepared for a sluggish season, many said sales turned out to be even worse than expected. Even the last-minute shopping frenzy was not enough to give merchants anything to cheer about.

As recently as a month ago, many retailers had hoped to exceed last year's sales by 5 percent. But results through the close of business on Monday indicate that spending will be flat or up slightly in December. The major retail chains are scheduled to release their final monthly sales results next week.

"We are disappointed with the season," Stephen E. Watson, president of the Dayton Hudson Corporation in Minneapolis, said in a telephone interview on Tuesday.

"Too Little Too Late"

Business surged in the final days, and a number of retailers said that Monday was the busiest day of the year. But Mr. Watson said, "In our view, it's really been too little too late." Dayton Hudson, which relies on California for one-third of its business, was hit hard by the slowdown in that state's economy.

This is the third consecutive sluggish Christmas shopping season — the



Mikhail S. Gorbachev after announcing his resignation last night as President of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet State, Born of a Dream, Dies

By SERGE SCHMEMMANN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Dec. 25 — The Soviet state, marked throughout its brief but tumultuous history by great achieve-

End of an Empire

A special report.

It was perhaps a paradox that the ruler who presided over the collapse of the Soviet Union was the only one of its ill-starred leaders to leave office with a measure of dignity intact.

Communist Flag Is Removed; Yeltsin Gets Nuclear Controls

By FRANCIS X. CLINES

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Dec. 25 — Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the trailblazer of the Soviet Union's retreat from the cold war and the spark for the democratic reforms that ended 70 years of Communist tyranny, told a weary, anxious nation tonight that he was resigning as President and closing out the union.

"I hereby discontinue my activities at the post of President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," declared the 69-year-old politician, the last leader of a totalitarian empire that was undone across the six years and nine months of his stewardship.

Mr. Gorbachev made no attempt in his brief, leanly worded television address to mask his bitter regret and concern at being forced from office by the creation of the new Commonwealth of Independent States, composed of 11 former republics of the collapsed Soviet empire under the informal lead of President Boris N. Yeltsin of Russia.

"A New World"

Within hours of Mr. Gorbachev's resignation, Western and other nations began recognition of Russia and the other former republics.

"We're now living in a new world," Mr. Gorbachev declared in recognizing the rich history of his tenure. "An end has been put to the cold war and to the arms race, as well as to the mad militarization of the country, which has crippled our economy, public attitudes and morals. The threat of nuclear war has been removed." [A transcript of Mr. Gorbachev's speech and excerpts from interviews with Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Yeltsin are on pages A12 and A13.]

Mr. Gorbachev's moment of farewell was stark. Kremlin guards were preparing to lower the red union flag for the last time. In minutes, Mr. Gorbachev would sign over the nuclear mis-

trustees as Mr. Gorbachev spoke, a disoriented people, freed from their decades of dictated misery, faced a frightening new course of shedding collectivism for the promises of individual enterprise. It is a course that remains a mystery for most of the commonwealth's 286 million people.

"I am very much concerned as I am leaving this post," the union President told the people. "However, I also have feelings of hope and faith in you, your wisdom and force of spirit. We are the heirs of a great civilization and it now depends on all and everyone whether or not this civilization will make a comeback to a new and decent living."

Still Against Commonwealth

In departing, the Soviet leader took comfort in the world's supporting his singular achievements in nuclear disarmament. But even more, he firmly warned his people that they had not yet learned to use their newly won freedom and that it could be put at risk by the

Continued on Page A12, Column 1

BUSH LAUDS VISION OF SOVIET LEADER

In Farewell, President Cites
Gorbachev's Historic Role

By MICHAEL WINES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 25 — President

Savranskaya, S., & Blanton, T. (Eds.). (2021, December 21). *The end of the Soviet Union 1991*.

National Security Archive. ⁷

These reforms caused even more chaos, entrepreneurs got rich quickly, ministers resisted, inequality raised, "official" private business mixed with the black market and factories raised their prices sharply. These all resulted in more economic instability as well as the supply chain to collapse. Due to all of these negative effects the people lost their confidence in the communist party even further, combining with all of the previous issues mentioned it led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, officially on 26 of December 1991.

4.1.4. German Reunification Question

Reaching the end of World War II the Allied Powers divided Germany into four occupation zones consisting of US, France, UK and lastly USSR these zones essentially separated into 2 ideological front lines with the East under Soviet influence being the front for communism, and the West being the line for democracy and capitalism. The 2 regions became military blocs, the Berlin Wall symbolizing the division of the communist and the capitalist world.


The reunification of Germany in 1990 was the most significant geopolitical transformation during the Cold War era, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were formally united on October 3, 1990. This process was one of the biggest symbols of the collapse of the Cold War binaries. With East Germany protesting as the communist governments in Eastern Europe collapsed, the Soviet Union had no power to stop reunification, with France, United Kingdom and the United States as well as USSR agreeing to unify as being another end of a communist regime.

4.1.5. Power Vacuum in Eastern Europe

The Eastern Europe Revolutions of 1989 were rapid collapses of communist regimes all across Central and mostly Eastern Europe. These revolutions were not singular events yet results of long term structural failures and the weakening of Soviet control. They were interconnected as one country's revolution destabilized another, giving it a political opening, a path in order to change the regime in its own nation which created a domino effect in the entirety of the region.

Communist rule in Eastern Europe always laid on a thin rope consisting of economic legitimacy, ideological belief and Soviet military support. By the 1980s none of these were consistent nor stable. Economic decline being the most visible weakness, with productivity declining constant shortages started to occur, alongside that the region was lacking in new innovations as well which they highly depended on. Goods were of poor quality and options were limited. It was seen that many regimes such as Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia attempted partial reforms though it only resulted in them becoming even more exposed to weaknesses; these consisted of hyperinflation following foreign debt. The promise of a peaceful socialist society already looked impossible by the late 70s. With all these issues communists in Europe were facing also came Mikhail Gorbachev abandoning the Brezhnev Doctrine in the mid 80s, which meant that the Red Army had abandoned Eastern Europe. Without the Red Army, Eastern Europe lacked the power to survive mass uprisings, which meant that the region became vulnerable to change.

The key spark during this situation was Hungary's decision to open its border with Austria in May 1989 for the first time since the Berlin Wall's construction meaning Eastern Europeans, mostly Germans could escape to the west, which undermined the legitimacy of East Germany, the most visible dictatorship in the region forcing governments to choose between violence and negotiations, while most chose negotiations, Romania decided the opposite.



Map 4 The collapse of communism in eastern Europe, 1989 (M. Gilbert, *Atlas of Russian History*, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 152)

4.1.6. Strategic Uncertainty Within NATO

The Cold War's end may seem to indicate that the issue of military force is closed forever in Europe. Yet the tumultuous events of 1990- 1992 suggest that an issue so historically enduring will not disappear entirely and may show surprising staying power. In the short time since the Cold War abruptly ended in late 1990, the Western allies have fought a major war in the Persian Gulf, Yugoslavia has plunged into bitter civil war, and violence has flared in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Meanwhile, Russia and Ukraine have brought the new Commonwealth of Independent States to near ruin with a partisan struggle over control of military forces, and NATO's nations have engaged in stressful debates over alliance defense relationships. If the new era is to be so peaceful, why are there so many squabbles over military issues, and why has there been so much violence?

Experts disagree about where European and global politics are headed, but NATO's governments are concerned enough to take military affairs seriously even though the Cold War has ended. At their London summit in mid-1990, NATO's leaders decided to begin crafting a new alliance military strategy for the post-Cold War era. Following eighteen months of internal debate conducted amidst the rapidly changing scene in Europe, NATO's leaders in late 1991 reconvened in Rome, where they formally unveiled a new strategic concept. The issue of whether NATO will have a post-Cold War military strategy has thus been settled. The remaining question is, Exactly what is this new strategy to be? The new strategic concept laid the foundation for a full-fledged military strategy. NATO is to remain a collective defense alliance anchored on a transatlantic partnership led, as in the past, by the United States, but now giving Western Europe a more influential role. NATO will become part of an interlocking set of institutions, along with the European Community (EC) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), aimed at building a stable security architecture in Europe. NATO will still have an integrated military command that

performs coalition planning, and it will still have sizable nuclear and conventional forces. The goals of its defense policy will be to protect NATO's borders, help foster dialogue and partnership with former adversaries, maintain a balance of power in Europe, and protect the alliance's larger interests.

Notwithstanding their accomplishments, the Rome summit participants had misgivings about NATO's future, and these are reflected less in what the new strategic concept says than in what it does not say. Arriving at a concept involved much compromise during a period of immense changes that occurred too rapidly for NATO officials to absorb their meaning, much less prescribe a definitive policy for dealing with them. As a result, the strategic concept makes sensible proclamations but is written in a vague and abstract manner that fails to fully engage many of the profound dilemmas facing NATO. Several important policy questions are thus left unanswered.

Among these questions are the following: Now that U.S. forces in Europe are being reduced, what will be the nature of the new transatlantic partnership, and how will it incorporate the allies' emerging desire for a separate European security identity? What challenges, risks, threats, and contingencies should be taken into account in shaping the new strategy? How is NATO to deal with Russia and the Commonwealth, with their reformist aspirations but still imposing military power? How is NATO to deal with growing security challenges beyond its borders, including in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East/Persian Gulf? What is to be NATO's military doctrine for conventional defense, nuclear deterrence, and escalation? What are to be NATO's force levels and defense budgets?

This imposing list of questions must be answered before NATO can be credited with having a fully articulated new military strategy. Because they are matters of considerable debate, the answers adopted will have an important impact not only on NATO's defense arrangements, but also on the alliance's ability to remain effective. They will also play an

influential role in determining how the emerging European security architecture takes shape and, indeed, whether the new era is peaceful. After all, military strategy has political meaning and is more than a passive response to an emerging security environment. It is itself a powerful engine of change, capable of channelling events in good directions or bad.

Thus, even though the Cold War has ended, NATO's new military strategy is an important item on the policy agenda, with many specific issues yet to be resolved. So far, the subject has been addressed primarily in the alliance's private councils. But if NATO's new strategy is to capture the widespread support needed for it to become a credible expression of intent, it must be examined in the public domain as well.

4.2. NATO's Institutional Position

4.2.1. 1991 NATO Rome Summit

The 1991 Rome Summit was the 12th NATO summit bringing the leaders of the member states together at the same time. The formal sessions and informal meeting in Rome, Italy; took place on 7-8 November 1991.

The United States, with Germany's support, proposed reconfiguring NATO's military. The military planners' projections contemplated an emphasis on smaller, highly mobile forces geared for fast reaction to an array of potential contingencies other than the defense of Western Europe against a conventional large-force assault. The re-constituted NATO-assets would be flexibly available for a broadly defined range of NATO-directed missions. The unanimous agreement with the essentials of these proposed changes was officially confirmed at the Rome summit. Although the French joined in principle in agreeing to the reformation of NATO's military, this did not signal that France would re-join NATO's military structure.

- *We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Rome to open a new chapter in the history of our Alliance.*

The far-reaching decisions we have taken here mark an important stage in the transformation of NATO that we launched in London last year.

- *The world has changed dramatically. The Alliance has made an essential contribution. The peoples of North America and the whole of Europe can now join in a community of shared values based on freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As an agent of change, a source of stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members' security, our Alliance will continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe: a Europe of cooperation and prosperity.*

A New Security Architecture

- *The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. Consequently, we are working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other. Regional frameworks of cooperation will also be important. This interaction will be of the greatest significance in preventing instability and divisions that could result from various causes, such as economic disparities and violent nationalism.*

The Future Role of the Alliance: Our New Strategic Concept

- *Yesterday, we published our new Strategic Concept . Our security has substantially improved: we no longer face the old threat of a massive attack. However, prudence requires us to maintain an overall strategic balance and to remain ready to meet any*

potential risks to our security which may arise from instability or tension. In an environment of uncertainty and unpredictable challenges, our Alliance, which provides the essential transatlantic link as demonstrated by the significant presence of North American forces in Europe, retains its enduring value. Our new strategic concept reaffirms NATO's core functions and allows us, within the radically changed situation in Europe, to realise in full our broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects, along with the indispensable defence dimension. Never has the opportunity to achieve our Alliance's objectives by political means, in keeping with Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty, been greater. Consequently, our security policy can now be based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue; cooperation; and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. The use, as appropriate, of these elements will be particularly important to prevent or manage crises affecting our security.

- *The military dimension of our Alliance remains an essential factor; but what is new is that, more than ever, it will serve a broad concept of security. The Alliance will maintain its purely defensive purpose, its collective arrangements based on an integrated military structure as well as cooperation and coordination agreements, and for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces. Our military forces will adjust to their new tasks, becoming smaller and more flexible. Thus, our conventional forces will be substantially reduced as will, in many cases, their readiness. They will also be given increased mobility to enable them to react to a wide range of contingencies, and will be organised for flexible build-up, when necessary, for crisis management as well as defence. Multinational formations will play a greater role within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces committed to NATO will be greatly reduced: the current NATO stockpile of sub-strategic*

weapons in Europe will be cut by roughly 80% in accordance with the decisions taken by the Nuclear Planning Group in Taormina . The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies remains political: to preserve peace, and prevent war or any kind of coercion.

European Security Identity and Defence Role

- *We reaffirm the consensus expressed by our Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen. The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. The enhancement of the role and responsibility of the European members is an important basis for the transformation of the Alliance. These two positive processes are mutually reinforcing. We are agreed, in parallel with the emergence and development of a European security identity and defence role, to enhance the essential transatlantic link that the Alliance guarantees and fully to maintain the strategic unity and indivisibility of security of all our members. The Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty. Recognising that it is for the European Allies concerned to decide what arrangements are needed for the expression of a common European foreign and security policy and defence role, we further agree that, as the two processes advance, we will develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance.*
- *We welcome the spirit in which those Allies who are also members of the Twelve and the WEU have kept the other members of the Alliance informed about the progress of*

their ongoing discussions on the development of the European identity and about other issues, such as their peace efforts in Yugoslavia. Appropriate links and consultation procedures between the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance will be developed in order to ensure that the Allies that are not currently participating in the development of a European identity in foreign and security policy and defence should be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security. The Alliance's new Strategic Concept, being an agreed conceptual basis for the forces of all Allies, should facilitate the necessary complementarity between the Alliance and the emerging defence component of the European integration process. As the transformation of the Alliance proceeds, we intend to preserve the operational coherence we now have and on which our defence depends. We welcome the perspective of a reinforcement of the role of the WEU, both as the defence component of the process of European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, bearing in mind the different nature of its relations with the Alliance and with the European Political Union.

- *We note the gradual convergence of views in the discussions concerning the developing European security identity and defence role compatible with the common defence policy we already have in our Alliance. We feel confident that in line with the consensus in Copenhagen, the result will contribute to a strong new transatlantic partnership by strengthening the European component in a transformed Alliance. We will help move this development forward.*

Relations with the Soviet Union and the Other Countries of Central and Eastern Europe: A Qualitative Step Forward

- *We have consistently encouraged the development of democracy in the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We therefore applaud the commitment of these countries to political and economic reform following the rejection of totalitarian communist rule by their peoples. We salute the newly recovered independence of the Baltic States. We will support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards reform and will give practical assistance to help them succeed in this difficult transition. This is based on our conviction that our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe.*
- *The Alliance can aid in fostering a sense of security and confidence in these countries, thereby strengthening their ability to fulfil their CSCE commitments and make democratic change irrevocable. Wishing to enhance its contribution to the emergence of a Europe whole and free, our Alliance at its London Summit extended to the Central and Eastern European countries the hand of friendship and established regular diplomatic liaison. Together we signed the Paris Joint Declaration. In Copenhagen last June, the Alliance took further initiatives to develop partnership with these countries. Our extensive programme of high level visits, exchanges of views on security and other related issues, intensified military contacts, and exchanges of expertise in various fields has demonstrated its value and contributed greatly to building a new relationship between NATO and these countries. This is a dynamic process: the growth of democratic institutions throughout Central and Eastern Europe and encouraging cooperative experiences, as well as the desire of these countries for closer ties, now call for our relations to be broadened, intensified and raised to a qualitatively new level.*
- *Therefore, as the next step, we intend to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues. We invite, at this stage*

of the process, the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Romania, and the Soviet Union to join our Foreign Ministers in December 1991 in Brussels to issue a joint political declaration to launch this new era of partnership and to define further the modalities and content of this process. In particular, we propose the following activities:

annual meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level in what might be called a North Atlantic Cooperation Council;

periodic meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ambassadorial level;

additional meetings with the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial or Ambassadorial level as circumstances warrant;

regular meetings, at intervals to be mutually agreed, with:

NATO subordinate committees, including the Political and Economic Committees;

the Military Committee and under its direction other NATO Military Authorities.

- *This process will contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the CSCE without prejudice to its competence and mechanisms. It will be carried out in accordance with the core functions of the Alliance.*
- *Our consultations and cooperation will focus on security and related issues where Allies can offer their experience and expertise, such as defence planning, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil/military coordination of air traffic management, and the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes. Our new initiative will enhance participation of our partners in the "Third Dimension" of*

scientific and environmental programmes of our Alliance. It will also allow the widest possible dissemination of information about NATO in the Central and Eastern European countries, inter alia through diplomatic liaison channels and our embassies. We will provide the appropriate resources to support our liaison activities.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

- *We remain deeply committed to strengthening the CSCE process, which has a vital role to play in promoting stability and democracy in Europe in a period of historic change. We will intensify our efforts to enhance the CSCE's role, in the first instance by working with the other participating CSCE states to ensure that the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting in 1992 will be another major step towards building a new Europe. The CSCE has the outstanding advantage of being the only forum that brings together all countries of Europe and Canada and the United States under a common code of human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law, security, and economic liberty. The new CSCE institutions and structures, which we proposed at our London Summit and which were created at the Paris Summit, must be consolidated and further developed so as to provide CSCE with the means to help ensure full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and other relevant CSCE documents and thus permit the CSCE to meet the new challenges which Europe will have to face. Our consultations within the Alliance continue to be a source of initiatives for strengthening the CSCE.*
- *Consequently, we will actively support the development of the CSCE to enhance its capacity as the organ for consultation and cooperation among all participating States, capable of effective action in line with its new and increased responsibilities, in particular on the questions of human rights and security including arms control*

and disarmament, and for effective crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes, consistent with international law and CSCE principles. To this end, we suggest:

that the CSCE Council, the central forum for political consultations, continue to take decisions on questions relating to the CSCE and the functions and structures of the CSCE institutions;

that the Committee of Senior Officials serve as the coordination and management body between Council sessions and that it acquire a greater operational capacity and meet more frequently, with a view to ensuring the implementation of decisions;

that the CSCE's conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities be improved: as one contribution, in addition to the functions entrusted to it by the Paris Charter, the means available to the Conflict Prevention Centre should be strengthened and made more flexible to enable it to fulfil the specific tasks assigned to it by the CSCE Council and the Committee of Senior Officials;

that specific tasks based on a precise mandate by the CSCE Council or the Committee of Senior Officials might be entrusted to ad hoc groups;

that the decisions taken at the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting ensure complementarity among CSCE activities in the security field including, inter alia, conflict prevention, arms control and consultations on security;

that consideration should be given within the CSCE to develop further the CSCE's capability to safeguard, through peaceful means, human rights, democracy and the rule of law in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected

violations of relevant CSCE commitments, if necessary in the absence of the consent of the state concerned;

that the Office for Free Elections be transformed into a broadly focused Office of Democratic Institutions to promote cooperation in the fields of human rights, democracy and the rule of law;

that the monitoring and promotion of progress on human dimension issues be continued in the form of periodic meetings of short duration on clearly defined issues;

that further political impetus be given to economic, scientific and environmental cooperation so as to promote the basis of prosperity for stable, democratic development.

Arms Control

- *We strongly support President Bush's initiative of 27th September 1991 which has opened new prospects for nuclear arms reduction. We also welcome President Gorbachev's response. We particularly applaud the decision of both sides to eliminate their nuclear warheads for ground-launched short-range weapons systems. The Allies concerned, through their consultations, have played a central role in President Bush's decision which fulfilled the SNF arms control objectives of the London Declaration. They will continue close consultations on the process of the elimination of ground-based SNF warheads until its completion. We will continue to work for security at minimum levels of nuclear arms sufficient to preserve peace and stability. We look forward to the early ratification of the recently signed START agreement.*
- *We note with satisfaction the recent achievements in the fields of conventional arms control and disarmament. We reiterate the paramount importance we attach to the*

CFE Treaty and call upon all CFE signatories to move forward promptly with its ratification and implementation. We urge our negotiating partners to work with us to reach substantial agreements in the CFE IA and CSBM negotiations, and remain dedicated to achieving concrete results by the time of the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting. We welcome the resumption of the Open Skies negotiations; we look forward to agreement on an Open Skies regime by the time of the Helsinki Meeting as an important new element in greater openness and confidence-building in the military field.

- *The Helsinki Meeting will mark a turning point in the arms control and disarmament process in Europe, now with the participation of all CSCE states. This will offer a unique opportunity to move this process energetically forward. Our goal will be to shape a new cooperative order, in which no country needs to harbour fears for its security, by:*

strengthening security and stability at lower levels of armed forces to the extent possible and commensurate with individual legitimate security needs both inside and outside of Europe;

conducting an intensified security dialogue within a permanent framework and fostering a new quality of transparency and cooperation about armed forces and defence policies; and

promoting effective mechanisms and instruments for conflict prevention.

- *The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery undermines international security. Transfers of conventional armaments beyond legitimate defensive needs to regions of tension make the peaceful settlement of disputes less likely. We support the establishment by the United Nations of a universal non-discriminatory register of conventional arms transfers. We support steps*

undertaken to address other aspects of proliferation and other initiatives designed to build confidence and underpin international security.

- *We also deem it essential to complete a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons next year. We welcome the positive results of the Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in particular the decision to explore the feasibility of verification.*

Broader Challenges

- *Our Strategic Concept underlines that Alliance security must take account of the global context. It points out risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage, which can affect Alliance security interests. We reaffirm the importance of arrangements existing in the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of our efforts including our responses to such risks. We will continue to address broader challenges in our consultations and in the appropriate multilateral forums in the widest possible cooperation with other states.*
- *The North Atlantic Alliance was founded with two purposes: the defence of the territory of its members, and the safeguarding and promotion of the values they share. In a still uncertain world, the need for defence remains. But in a world where the values which we uphold are shared ever more widely, we gladly seize the opportunity to adapt our defences accordingly; to cooperate and consult with our new partners; to help consolidate a now undivided continent of Europe; and to make our Alliance's contribution to a new age of confidence, stability and peace.*

- *We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by the Government of the Italian Republic.*

4.2.2. 1990 London Summit

The 1990 London Declaration is a declaration published on the restructuring of the mission and vision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). After the circumstances of the time and the military conditions that necessitated NATO's military presence disappeared, NATO transformed its existence from a predominantly military organization to a collective defense organization with stronger political pillars.



Portrait at Lancaster House of the delegates attending the Nato Summit in London in July 1990

- *Article 1: Europe has entered a new, promising era. Central and Eastern Europe is liberating itself. The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey toward a free*

society. The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are determining their own destiny. They are choosing freedom. They are choosing economic liberty. They are choosing peace. They are choosing a Europe whole and free. As a consequence, this Alliance must and will adapt.

➤ **Article 2:** *The North Atlantic Alliance has been the most successful defensive alliance in history. As our Alliance enters its fifth decade and looks ahead to a new century, it must continue to provide for the common defence. This Alliance has done much to bring about the new Europe. No-one, however, can be certain of the future. We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty.*

➤ **Article 3:** *The unification of Germany means that the division of Europe is also being overcome. A united Germany in the Atlantic Alliance of free democracies and part of the growing political and economic integration of the European Community will be an indispensable factor of stability, which is needed in the heart of Europe. The move within the European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic*

solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe.

- **Article 4:** *We recognise that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.*

- **Article 5:** *We will remain a defensive alliance and will continue to defend all the territory of all our members. We have no aggressive intentions and we commit ourselves to the peaceful resolution of all disputes. We will never in any circumstance be the first to use force.*

- **Article 6:** *The member states of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization a joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the CSCE Final Act. We invite all other CSCE member states to join us in this commitment to non-aggression.*

- **Article 7:** *In that spirit, and to reflect the changing political role of the Alliance, we today invite President Gorbachev on behalf of the Soviet Union, and representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries to come to Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council. We today also invite the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to come to NATO, not just to visit, but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change.*

- **Article 8:** *Our Alliance will do its share to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion. We are ready to intensify military contacts, including those of NATO Military Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European capitals.*

- **Article 9:** *We welcome the invitation to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner to visit Moscow and meet with Soviet leaders.*

- **Article 10:** *Military leaders from throughout Europe gathered earlier this year in Vienna to talk about their forces and doctrine. NATO proposes another such meeting this Autumn to promote common understanding. We intend to establish an entirely different quality of openness in Europe, including an agreement on "Open Skies" .*

- **Article 11:** *The significant presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe demonstrates the underlying political compact that binds North America's fate to Europe's democracies. But, as Europe changes, we must profoundly alter the way we think about defence.*

- **Article 12:** *To reduce our military requirements, sound arms control agreements are essential. That is why we put the highest priority on completing this year the first treaty to reduce and limit conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) along with the completion of a meaningful CSBM package. These talks should remain in continuous session until the work is done. Yet we hope to go further. We propose that, once a CFE Treaty is signed, follow-on talks should begin with the same membership and mandate, with the goal of building on the current agreement with additional measures, including measures to limit manpower in Europe. With this goal in mind, a commitment will be given at the time of signature of the CFE Treaty concerning the manpower levels of a unified Germany.*

- **Article 13:** *Our objective will be to conclude the negotiations on the follow-on to CFE and CSBMs as soon as possible and looking to the follow-up meeting of the CSCE to be held in Helsinki in 1992. We will seek through new conventional arms control negotiations, within the CSCE framework, further far-reaching measures in the 1990s to limit the offensive capability of conventional armed forces in Europe, so as to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power on the continent. NATO's High Level Task Force will formulate a detailed position for these follow-on conventional arms control talks. We will make provisions as needed for*

different regions to redress disparities and to ensure that no one's security is harmed at any stage. Furthermore, we will continue to explore broader arms control and confidence-building opportunities. This is an ambiguous agenda, but it matches our goal: enduring peace in Europe.

➤ **Article 14:** *As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a treaty limiting conventional armed forces is implemented, the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy will change fundamentally to include the following elements:*

- **Article 14.1:** *NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.*
- **Article 14.2:** *NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises.*
- **Article 14.3:** *NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed.*

➤ **Article 15:** *To keep the peace, the Alliance must maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe, and kept up to date where necessary. But, as a defensive Alliance, NATO has always stressed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence and that we seek the lowest and most stable level of nuclear forces needed to secure the prevention of war.*

- **Article 16:** *The political and military changes in Europe, and the prospects of further changes, now allow the Allies concerned to go further. They will thus modify the size and adapt the tasks of their nuclear deterrent forces. They have concluded that, as a result of the new political and military conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced role for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range. They have decided specifically that, once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, the Alliance will propose, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union, the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe.*

- **Article 17:** *New negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range forces should begin shortly after a CFE agreement is signed. The Allies concerned will develop an arms control framework for these negotiations which takes into account our requirements; for far fewer nuclear weapons, and the diminished need for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range.*

- **Article 18:** *Finally, with the total withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces and the implementation of a CFE agreement, the Allies concerned can reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. These will continue to fulfil an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted. However, in the transformed Europe, they will be able to adopt a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.*

- **Article 19:** *We approve the mandate given in Turnberry to the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to oversee the ongoing work on the adaptation of the Alliance to the new circumstances. It should report its conclusions as soon as possible.*

- **Article 20:** *In the context of these revised plans for defence and arms control, and with the advice of NATO Military Authorities and all member states concerned, NATO will prepare a new Allied military strategy moving away from "forward defence" where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying "flexible response" to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In that connection NATO will elaborate new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe. NATO will also provide a forum for Allied consultation on the upcoming negotiations on short-range nuclear forces.*

- **Article 21:** *The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) should become more prominent in Europe's future, bringing together the countries of Europe and North America. We support a CSCE Summit later this year in Paris which would include the signature of a CFE agreement and would set new standards for the establishment, and preservation, of free societies. It should endorse, inter alia:*
 - **Article 21.1:** *CSCE principles on the right to free and fair elections;*
 - **Article 21.2:** *CSCE commitments to respect and uphold the rule of law;*
 - **Article 21.3:** *CSCE guidelines for enhancing economic cooperation, based on the development of free and competitive market economies; and*
 - **Article 21.4:** *CSCE cooperation on environmental protection.*

- **Article 22:** *We further propose that the CSCE Summit in Paris decide how the CSCE can be institutionalised to provide a forum for wider political dialogue in a more united Europe. We recommend that CSCE governments establish:*
- **Article 22.1:** *a programme for regular consultations among member governments at the Heads of State and Government or Ministerial level, at least once each year, with other periodic meetings of officials to prepare for and follow up on these consultations;*
 - **Article 22.2:** *a schedule of CSCE review conferences once every two years to assess progress toward a Europe whole and free;*
 - **Article 22.3:** *a small CSCE secretariat to coordinate these meetings and conferences;*
 - **Article 22.4:** *a CSCE mechanism to monitor elections in all the CSCE countries, on the basis of the Copenhagen Document;*
 - **Article 22.5:** *a CSCE Centre for the Prevention of Conflict that might serve as a forum for exchange of military information, discussion of unusual military activities, and the conciliation of disputes involving CSCE member states; and*
 - **Article 22.6:** *a CSCE parliamentary body, the Assembly of Europe, to be based on the existing parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, and include representatives of all CSCE member states.*
 - **Article 22.7:** *The sites of these new institutions should reflect the fact that the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe form part of the political structures of the new Europe.*
- **Article 23:** *Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent.*

(Direct quote from the London Declaration 1990)

4.3. Key Sources of Instability in Eastern Europe

4.3.1. Relations with the Balkans

4.3.1.1. North Macedonia

On March 27, 2020, formal admission to the Washington Treaty (also known as the North Atlantic Treaty) was filed with the US State Department, and North Macedonia officially joined the Alliance. The country was previously known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Republic of North Macedonia has been legally recognized since February 15, 2019, following the complete execution of an agreement between Athens and Skopje on the question of the country's name.

The country became a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1995. In 1999, the nation signed up for the Membership Action Plan, which sets the nation's reform objectives and timelines in an Annual National Programme. Allies praised the historic name deal reached by Athens and Skopje at the July 2018 Brussels Summit and urged the Skopje government to start talks with NATO about membership. Additionally, allies pushed for faster advancement on crucial changes, both before and after admittance.

The Accession Protocol was signed by the Allies on February 6, 2019. The 29 Allies then went through their own national processes to ratify the Accession Protocol. When the Instrument of Accession was lodged in Washington, D.C. on March 27, 2020, North Macedonia officially joined the Alliance. In the upcoming months, the NATO Liaison Office in Skopje will concentrate on helping North Macedonia with defense reforms and complete integration into the Alliance. The country has long made a considerable

contribution to NATO-led missions and operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. When ethnic Albanian rebels and security forces battled in the country's west in February 2001, NATO provided assistance to the country.

The Allies are devoted to keeping NATO's door open to Western Balkan nations who desire membership in the Alliance, adhere to its principles, and are prepared and able to fulfill the responsibilities and obligations that come with membership. The best strategy for preserving the region's long-term, self-sustaining security and stability is thought to be Euro-Atlantic integration.

The nation (then known as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) would be invited to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable resolution to the name dispute with Greece was achieved, and allies resolved at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit. It was frequently reiterated at succeeding summits.

Allied leaders welcomed the historic settlement made between Athens and Skopje on the name dispute during the July 2018 Brussels Summit. In accordance with NATO policy, they resolved to request that the Skopje administration initiate admission discussions with the Alliance. After the Allies ratified the country's accession procedure, the Republic of North Macedonia became an "invitee" to NATO activities.

The full implementation of all indicated internal processes regarding the agreement on the solution to the name problem was a critical necessity for the successful termination of the NATO admission process, and these processes were accomplished by February 15, 2019.

The Allies continued to encourage and assist the country's reform initiatives, especially those aimed at ensuring effective democratic debate, media freedom, judicial independence, and a fully functional multiethnic society.

After the Accession Protocol was approved in the capitals of all 29 Allies, North Macedonia joined the Washington Treaty and was admitted as a full member of the Alliance. Formalizing this was the submission of the Instrument of Accession with the US State Department.

From 2002 till the end of 2014, North Macedonia contributed troops to Afghanistan in support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force. It is presently assisting the Resolute Support operation, which is tasked with advising, training, and assisting Afghan security forces.

NATO forces were stationed in North Macedonia in 1999 to halt the expansion of the war and give logistical support to the Kosovo Force (KFOR), and the nation was an important partner in assisting NATO-led stability operations in Kosovo. The Allies also supplied humanitarian aid to North Macedonia to assist them in dealing with the influx of refugees from Kosovo. Throughout the KFOR operation, the country housed a NATO military headquarters in Skopje, and it continues to offer critical host nation assistance to KFOR personnel passing through its territory.

4.3.1.2. Kosovo

As part of the NATO Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative in December 2017, Serbia provided training for Iraqi military and civilian medical personnel.

In recent years, the security situation has steadily improved. NATO military ministers decided to gradually change KFOR's force posture into a deterrent presence as a consequence on June 11 and 12, 2009. The so-called Gate 1 in its transition to a deterrent presence has been successfully completed by KFOR, reducing the number of personnel on the ground to around 10,200, according to the NATO Military Authorities, who informed NATO defence ministers during their informal session in Istanbul on the 3–4 February 2010. On October 29, 2010, the North Atlantic Council granted the NATO Military Authorities' request to relocate to Gate 2, which has a capacity for 5,000 personnel. Initiated on February 28, 2011.

Any subsequent move to scale back KFOR's presence in Kosovo will need the approval of the North Atlantic Council. Nations have made it plain that any such decision must take the sustainability of advantageous conditions in the field into account.

The so called "unfixing process," which comprises progressively turning over protection for religious and cultural monuments secured by KFOR to Kosovo Police, was also made possible by increased security in Kosovo.

The Gazimestan Monument, Gracanica Monastery, Zociste Monastery, Budisavci Monastery, Gorioc Monastery, the Archangel site, Devic Monastery, and the Pec Patriarchate are eight properties with Designated Special Status that KFOR has left unfixed by the end of 2013. The Decani Monastery is the only known location that KFOR is currently guarding.

Beyond the tasks delegated to KFOR, NATO engages in capacity-building efforts with the security agencies in Kosovo. The NATO Liaison and Advisory Team (NLAT), which continued to support the KSF after the North Atlantic Council declared the KSF's full operational capability, and the NATO Advisory and Liaison Team (NALT), which was formed in 2016 as a result of the merger of two entities: the NATO Advisory Team (NAT), which was formed in 2008 to oversee the establishment of a civilian-led organization of Kosovo authorities to exercise civilian control over the KSF.

The NATO International Staff provides direct reporting to the NALT. It is now staffed by 45 military and civilian personnel from 13 Allied and partner countries. It offers critical logistical, buying, finance, force planning, and leadership development aid and direction to Kosovo's security forces. To achieve its goals, the Team is currently organized around three development axes: strategy & plans, operations, and support.

Furthermore, the NALT is critical to carrying out the North Atlantic Council's commitment to increased engagement with Kosovo in December 2016. This greater

engagement will focus on critical themes such as science, public diplomacy, establishing integrity, and cybersecurity.

On May 22, 2013, an implementation plan was established, and on April 19, 2013, the First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations between Belgrade and Pristina was signed with EU support. NATO played a significant role in making the agreement feasible, and members continue to strongly support it. Belgrade and Pristina have begun a series of high-level talks to promote the Agreement, which will be backed by the European Union. This dialogue has strengthened relations between the two parties and contributed to the resolution of their political impasse. The subject has also given a fresh start to the Western Balkans' Euro-Atlantic integration.

The European Council decided to begin membership negotiations with Belgrade and negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Pristina in June 2013. On October 27, 2015, the SAA was signed, and on April 1, 2016, it came into force. Within the confines of its current mission, KFOR is prepared to help in the execution of the Belgrade-Pristina Agreement by ensuring a climate of peace and security. NATO continues to strongly support this agreement politically.

4.3.1.3. Serbia

Montenegro joined the Alliance after formally ratifying the Washington Treaty on June 5, 2017. The Western Balkan governments who desire to join NATO, support its principles, and are prepared and able to fulfill the commitments that come with membership are committed to doing so by the Allies. Considered to be the best choice for ensuring the long-term, self-sustaining security and stability of the area, euro-atlantic integration.

The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a program developed by NATO to offer guidance, support, and practical help to nations seeking to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not influence the Alliance's decision on potential membership.

In the fall of 2010, Montenegro began its first MAP cycle by presenting its first Annual National Programme. Using this strategy, the administration was able to pinpoint important issues that needed to be resolved, such as enhancing the rule of law, meeting NATO standards for security sector reforms, and battling corruption and organized crime.

The Allies reached the decision to urge the nation to begin accession discussions to join the Alliance in December 2015. They went on to stress that they expect greater reform progress, particularly in the rule of law, and that NATO will continue to support and assist through the MAP.

The Montenegro Accession Protocol was signed by allied foreign ministers on May 19, 2016. Following the Protocol's signing, Montenegro was granted 'Invitee' status, allowing its representatives to attend Allied sessions as observers.

Montenegro may become a full member of the Washington Treaty and the Alliance once all 28 Allies accepted the Accession Protocol. The entry documents were filed with the US State Department, which formalized this.

The potential of Montenegro's military to operate with soldiers from NATO members and other partners, particularly in peacekeeping and crisis-management operations, is a primary emphasis of NATO's participation with the country. Participating in collaborative planning, training, and military drills that fall within the ambit of the PfP program is critical in this respect.

In addition to a Croatian battalion, Montenegro decided to send troops to the NATO-led International Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in February 2010. After the ISAF campaign ended at the end of 2014, Montenegro is currently assisting the follow-up operation to train, advise, and support Afghan security forces. Prior attempts to arm and train the Afghan National Army received 1,600 guns and a total of 2,500 rounds of ammunition from Montenegro. A future expansion of the Afghan National Security Forces would also get financial backing, the government has further pledged.

Reforms in the military and security sector are necessary for cooperation. The nation may benefit from the Alliance's extensive knowledge in this area, both as a whole and as individual Allies. The efforts of Montenegro to change its larger democratic, institutional, and judicial institutions are also supported by the Allies.

Montenegro undertook a new Strategic Defense Review in 2013 and developed a long-term plan for its armed forces. These documents paved the way for a major overhaul of the nation's defense infrastructure.

The country's participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) helps to prepare soldiers who can carry out relief and peacekeeping operations with NATO and partner forces.

Additionally, Montenegro participates in NATO's Building Integrity Program, which strives to enhance security and military sector governance. This program seeks to increase transparency and accountability in the security sector, raise knowledge of best practices, and provide useful tools to help countries improve integrity and lower corruption risks.

The UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which acknowledges the disproportionate effect of war and conflict on women and children, is also being supported by the government's cooperation with NATO. Resolution 1325 of the UN Security Council calls for the full and equal participation of women in all spheres, from conflict prevention through post-conflict reconstruction, peacekeeping, and security.

Montenegro participates in a variety of cyber protection initiatives. A significant security and environmental worry for Montenegro continues to be the availability of surplus and obsolete weapons and ammunition. Realistic Trust Fund activities in this area have already been financed by NATO allies and partners, including a program to clear anti-personnel landmines in both Serbia and Montenegro. A new Trust Fund project with Montenegro started in the summer of 2016 to make it possible for around 416 tonnes of weapons to be safely demilitarized.

Montenegro is creating a national crisis situation center, a national early warning system, and emergency response capabilities in collaboration with NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

From October 31 to November 4, 2016, Montenegro hosted the "Crna Gora 2016" consequence-management field exercise. The Montenegrin Directorate for Operational Affairs and the EADRCC coordinated the exercise.

4.3.1.4. Montenegro

Montenegro joined the Alliance after formally ratifying the Washington Treaty on June 5, 2017. The Western Balkan governments who desire to join NATO, support its principles, and are prepared and able to fulfill the commitments that come with membership are committed to doing so by the Allies. Considered to be the best choice for

ensuring the long-term, self-sustaining security and stability of the area, euro-atlantic integration.

The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a program developed by NATO to offer guidance, support, and practical help to nations seeking to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not influence the Alliance's decision on potential membership.

In the fall of 2010, Montenegro began its first MAP cycle by presenting its first Annual National Programme. Using this strategy, the administration was able to pinpoint important issues that needed to be resolved, such as enhancing the rule of law, meeting NATO standards for security sector reforms, and battling corruption and organized crime.

The Allies reached the decision to urge the nation to begin accession discussions to join the Alliance in December 2015. They went on to stress that they expect greater reform progress, particularly in the rule of law, and that NATO will continue to support and assist through the MAP.

The Montenegro Accession Protocol was signed by allied foreign ministers on May 19, 2016. Following the Protocol's signing, Montenegro was granted 'Invitee' status, allowing its representatives to attend Allied sessions as observers.

Montenegro may become a full member of the Washington Treaty and the Alliance once all 28 Allies accepted the Accession Protocol. The entry documents were filed with the US State Department, which formalized this.

The potential of Montenegro's military to operate with soldiers from NATO members and other partners, particularly in peacekeeping and crisis-management operations, is a primary emphasis of NATO's participation with the country. Participating in collaborative

planning, training, and military drills that fall within the ambit of the PfP program is critical in this respect.

In addition to a Croatian battalion, Montenegro decided to send troops to the NATO-led International Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in February 2010. After the ISAF campaign ended at the end of 2014, Montenegro is currently assisting the follow-up operation to train, advise, and support Afghan security forces. Prior attempts to arm and train the Afghan National Army received 1,600 guns and a total of 2,500 rounds of ammunition from Montenegro. A future expansion of the Afghan National Security Forces would also get financial backing, the government has further pledged.

Reforms in the military and security sector are necessary for cooperation. The nation may benefit from the Alliance's extensive knowledge in this area, both as a whole and as individual Allies. The efforts of Montenegro to change its larger democratic, institutional, and judicial institutions are also supported by the Allies.

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4.3.2. Ethnic Nationalism and Separatist Movements

With the collapse of the USSR, the concept of a New World Order began to be heard more frequently in the world's media and in the speeches of its leaders. The concept

emerged against the background of the ending of the Cold War between two polarized political ideologies, the capitalist and the communist, headed by the USA and the USSR respectively. Supposedly, the New World Order was ushering in an era of world peace.

Although the disintegration of the Soviet Union has, largely, put an end to the end of Cold War, the world has not become more peaceful. The bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia and other savage conflicts have signaled the emergence of a new nationalism. In this context, to justify the use of force we frequently hear talk of self-determination and the rights of peoples.

Membership of the United Nations has increased sharply only twice in its history. The first time was in the late fifties and early sixties, at the people of the decolonization following the retreat of the Western imperial powers. The second time was after the disintegration of the Soviet empire and then, a little later, of Yugoslavia. In the latter case, the new sovereign nation-states were not colonies achieving a new independence.

It is thought that the latest increase in the number of nation-states will encourage distinct communities within larger states to seek some measure of independence. Although the legal right for self-determination as the basis for the use of force to gain independence is not new, it would be wrong to deny that the use of force is now perceived as a likely means of realizing full independence or some degree of autonomy. That perception is surely one of the strongest reasons behind many of the conflicts currently stretching taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Kashmir, Northern Iraq, Somalia, Dniester region of Moldova, the Abkhazian region of Georgia, etc. These are only some of the hot spots which have one, or more than one group of people engaged in armed struggle for independence. Of course the list could easily be enlarged.

Language is certainly a decisive factor in the assertion of ethnic identity. According to the Summer Institute of Linguistics, Dallas, Texas, there are 6,170 languages spoken in the

world at this time. However, there are only 184 states in the world, the latest additions being Eritrea, Monaco and Andorra.

The steady increase in the number of nation-states indicates that the process of state-building is far from over. International analysts John O'Loughlin and Herman van der Wusten expect the number to reach around 250 by the middle of the next century. The way that number will be attained is likely to be by using force. That likelihood alone is enough reason for taking the issue very seriously. For, as the number of nation-states increases, so too do the chances of war between them as the conflicts of interest between the states become more complicated.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, it was a self-evident truth that wars, strictly speaking, could only be engaged in by established states. Other terms were used to describe other forms of violence such as insurrection, civil unrest, piracy, or rebellion. At most, there was 'civil war' where the adjective modified the idea and the law which applied.

Especially after the Second World War, opinions about what constitutes war and which entities in the international arena may wage war have altered. The swift break-up of colonial empires and the increasing consensus that there was a right of peoples to self-determination have led some to the view that wars of national liberation are international wars, albeit they are not inter-state wars. It can be convincingly argued that the rules governing the Legitimacy of resort to force (*jus ad bellum*) and the rules governing the conduct of hostilities (*jus in bello*) have changed markedly since the Second World War and especially since 1960.

As the ethnic conflicts spread around the world, they are becoming another source of human misery in the aftermath of the Cold War. It is a reality of our time that secessionist, irridentist, and national liberation wars are the greatest killers-either directly through bloodshed or indirectly through hunger or disease stemming from such wars, that is, related

to national liberation or separatist movements. For the last two years, we have been witnessing through the nastiest example of such a conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Unless a remedy is found to these ethnic disputes, the peoples of the earth will not experience in the foreseeable future the peace that seemed to be, to so many, the promise of the end of the Cold War era.

4.3.3. Weak State Institutions and Governance Failures

Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens.

The rise and fall of nation-states is not new, but in a modern era when national states constitute the building blocks of legitimate world order the violent disintegration and palpable weakness of selected African, Asian, Oceanic, and Latin American states threaten the very foundation of that system. International organizations and big powers consequently find themselves sucked disconcertingly into a maelstrom of anomic internal conflict and messy humanitarian relief. Desirable international norms such as stability and predictability thus become difficult to achieve when so many of the globe's newer nation-states waver precariously between weakness and failure, with some truly failing, or even collapsing. In a time of terror, moreover, appreciating the nature of and responding to the dynamics of nation-state failure have become central to critical policy debates. How best to strengthen weak states and prevent state failure are among the urgent questions of the twenty-first century.

It establishes clear criteria for distinguishing collapse and failure from generic weakness or apparent distress, and collapse from failure. It further analyzes the nature of state weakness and advances reasons why some weak states succumb to failure, or collapse, and why others in ostensibly more straightened circumstances remain weak and at risk without

ever destructing. Characterizing failed states is thus an important and relevant endeavor, especially because the phenomenon of state failure is under-researched, hitherto with imprecise definitions and a paucity of sharply argued, instructive, and well-delineated cases. Further, understanding exactly why weak states slide toward failure will help policymakers to design methods to prevent failure and, in the cases of states that nevertheless fail (or collapse), to revive them and assist in the rebuilding process.

States are much more varied in their capacity and capability than they once were. They are more numerous than they were a half century ago, and the range of their population sizes, physical endowments, wealth, productivity, delivery systems, ambitions, and attainments is much more extensive than ever before. In 1914, in the wake of the crumbling of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, there were fifty-five recognized national polities. In 1919, there were fifty-nine nations. In 1950, that number had reached sixty-nine. Ten years later, after the attainment of independence in much of Africa, ninety were nations. After many more African, Asian, and Oceanic territories had become independent, and after the implosion of the Soviet Union, the number of nations jumped to 191; East Timor's independence in 2002 brought that total to 192. Given such explosive numbers, the inherent fragility of many of the new recruits (fifteen of Africa's fifty-four states are landlocked), and the inherent navigational perils of the post-Cold War economic and political terrain, the possibility of failure among a subset of the total remains ever present.

4.3.4. Economic Collapse and Transition Crises

The end of the Cold War marked a new phase in an increasingly global, but highly uneven, process of economic liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation that had been building momentum since the 1970s. The rise and spread of neoliberalism is at the centre of a wider set of social, economic, political, cultural and technological changes that are increasingly identified collectively as globalisation (the more specific term of 'neoliberal globalisation' has also been used in this special issue). All the articles in this collection have

framed their analysis of particular nation-states against the backdrop of the changes in the global political economy and the transition from an array of national development projects to the globalisation project. This is now being pursued at a wide range of sites by a generally unaccountable, transnationalised elite, inspired by a 'free enterprise' and 'free trade' vision of the global economy. As has been emphasised, a key aspect of the globalisation project has been the reconfiguration of nation-states into neoliberal states in the context of the Cold War and its aftermath.

This world-historical trend has also paralleled a perceived shift from authoritarian to more democratic forms of politics in many parts of the world. In fact, a virtuous connection between economic and political liberalism continues to be emphasised by a range of commentators who stress the more or less unalloyed benefits of neoliberal globalisation. However, the influential vision of an inexorable march towards global democracy and universal free market prosperity defines democracy in particularly minimalist terms (elections, universal suffrage and relative press freedom) and tends to downplay or ignore the connection between uneven capitalist development, social inequality and political instability. The articles in this collection have emphasised that the rise of the globalisation project, and its consolidation in the post-cold war era, is contributing to both the dramatic reorientation and/or the fragmentation of nation-states. New and reconfigured socioeconomic fault lines, linked in complex ways to an array of national and ethnic mobilisations and the growing polarisation between rich and poor, have emerged and are clearly connected to the consolidation of socially exclusionary neoliberal states. These trends are all central to the post-cold war predicament, the essence of which is the absence of grand systemic challenges to neoliberal globalisation and the globalisation project. Against this backdrop, this short concluding article makes some general comments on the main themes of this special issue: the rise and decline of state-centred national development projects, the reorientation and/or

fragmentation of nation-states in the post-cold war era and the prospects for progressive alternatives to the dominant neoliberal vision of global capitalism.

4.3.5. Military Fragmentation and Security Dilemmas

In the post-Cold War era, the best way of deterring major wars between the principal geopolitical actors is the creation of the global security system that we mentioned above. Moreover, an intercontinental deal between an expanded NATO, Russia, China, Japan and possibly India, which would gradually give rise to a more formal structure, could play a decisive role in the deterrence of regional aggressors globally.

US foreign policy must strike a balance between its idealism and realpolitik. In Kissinger's words, this means, "There is a margin between necessity and accident, in which a statesman by perseverance and intuition must choose and thereby shape the destiny of his people. To ignore objective conditions is perilous; to hide behind historical inevitability is tantamount to moral abdication." International problems must be tackled on a case by case basis as components in a geo-strategic equation. Moralistic or legalistic approaches fail to identify the particular characteristics of each international problem and thus lure one into failure, since they tend to lead to the exchange of a lesser evil for a greater one. For instance, Jeanne Kirkpatrick argues, "[The] Carter administration ... wanted to bring about moderate and democratic regimes in Iran and Nicaragua. And they had followed certain policies in the effort to bring about more moderate and democratic regimes. But what they produced were the more repressive, hostile regimes of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Ortega brothers."

Balance-of-power arrangements best serve the pursuit of international security. Kissinger argues that, when working properly, the balance-of-power system is "meant to limit both the ability of states to dominate others and the scope of conflicts ... a balance-of-power arrangement cannot satisfy every member of the international system completely; it works best when it keeps dissatisfaction below the level at which the aggrieved party will seek to overthrow the international order." Thus, US foreign policy should be based on the ideals of

freedom and order, but it should pursue them by examining the geopolitical environment characterising each segment of space-time. In particular, the post-Cold War international system obliges the United States, for the first time in its history, to found its foreign policy on the maintenance of balance-of-power arrangements, since the global security system of the post-Cold War era should be based on NATO, Russia, China, Japan and India.

In addition to working towards the creation of the global security system that we have already discussed, the United States should take more short-term measures too. First, regional aggressors are difficult to deter if they expect their hold on power to erode if they do not take risks. Thus, the US deterrent strategy must be credible; namely, the adversary must believe that the US has both the intention and the capability of doing what it threatens to do.

4.3.6. Early Intervention in Balkans and Impact of the Operations on NATO

NATO conducted a variety of operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina during and after the Bosnian War with the objective of ensuring long-term peace. Initially intended to be purely political and symbolic, NATO's involvement quickly expanded to include significant airstrikes and the deployment of approximately 60,000 Implementation Force personnel. (Kay, 1998)

NATO entered the Bosnian War and the Yugoslav Wars in general in February 1992 when it issued a statement requesting that the combatants permit the deployment of UN troops. This proclamation, however, mostly symbolic, served as the foundation for further NATO operations. (JFC Naples/AFSOUTH, 1951-2009: OVER FIFTY YEARS WORKING FOR PEACE AND STABILITY)

The foreign ministers of NATO resolved to support the UN in making sure that the sanctions imposed by UN Security Council Resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992) are

being complied with on July 10, 1992, in Helsinki (JFC Naples/AFSOUTH, 1951-2009: OVER FIFTY YEARS WORKING FOR PEACE AND STABILITY).

This led to the start of Operation Maritime Monitor on July 16 off the coast of Montenegro, which was coordinated with Operation Sharp Guard of the Western European Union in the Strait of Otranto. The Security Council passed Resolution 781, creating a no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina, on October 9, 1992. NATO expanded its regional mission on October 16 to include mission Sky Monitor, which kept a look out for aircraft entering Bosnian airspace from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In order to guarantee that sanctions were being followed, the Security Council enacted Resolution 787 on November 16, 1992, instructing member nations to "halt all inbound and outbound maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargos." (United Nation Security Council, 1992) As a result of this decision, Operation Maritime Guard, which permitted NATO soldiers to halt ships and examine their cargo, gradually replaced Maritime Monitor on November 22. This was a true enforcement operation, not merely a monitoring expedition, in contrast to Sky Monitor and Maritime Monitor.

NATO's role in aviation has likewise shifted from surveillance to enforcement. The Security Council's Resolution 816 allowed governments the right to take steps "to ensure compliance" with the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO responded by initiating Operation Deny Flight on April 12, 1993, with the purpose of enforcing the no-fly zone with fighter aircraft stationed nearby. (United Nations Security Council, 1993)

Throughout 1993, NATO forces gradually increased their presence in Bosnia. NATO and the UN agreed on June 10th, 1993, that upon UN request, aircraft flying the Deny Flight flag would provide close air support to UNPROFOR. On June 15, Operation Sharp Guard

was expanded by NATO to incorporate greater enforcement capabilities by integrating Operation Maritime Guard and the naval operations of the Western European Union in the region.

Operation Maritime Guard; NATO's Operation Maritime Guard was used to blockade the former Yugoslavia in the international waterways of the Adriatic Sea. The operation began on November 22, 1992. It supported UN Security Council Resolution 787, which encouraged governments to enforce the UN embargoes imposed on the former Yugoslavia, either individually or collectively. It followed NATO's Operation Maritime Monitor. (Pike, 2010)

In addition to having the power to stop, search, and redirect ships headed for the former Yugoslavia, it also granted NATO the right to use force. All ships leaving or entering the former Yugoslavia's territorial waters were halted, and both their cargo and their destinations were examined.

Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey intensified the operation, enabling NATO jets to shoot down aircraft that breached the sanctions. A NATO official said in April 1993 that “Warships would shoot if necessary to stop a ship to enforce the blockade, with inert munitions which could include machine gun bullets and armor-piercing cannon shells.” (Pike, 2010)

The NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft aided in the blockade, which comprised destroyers from Turkey, Italy, Germany, Greece, and the United Kingdom, as well as frigates from the United States and the Netherlands. Two of the vessels involved in the operation were the frigate USS Kauffman and the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt. With its advanced marine radar, AWACS aided the campaign by providing long-range sea surveillance coverage to blockading ships.

US Admiral Mike Boorda, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in Southern Europe, issued the order for the blockade. The blockade resulted in the approach of 12,367 ships, 1,032 of which were inspected or routed to a port for inspection, and 9 ships were found to be in violation of UN embargoes. (Pike, 2010)

In the military, Operation Sharp Guard was its replacement. The former Yugoslavia was the target of a multi-year naval blockade by NATO and the Western European Union in the Adriatic Sea. On June 15, 1993, it was put into effect. On June 19, 1996, it came to an end. Finally, on October 2, 1996, it was removed.

The Balkans have unquestionably had a significant impact on NATO, but the opposite is also true. The Alliance's first military action on land, the deployment of IFOR in December 1995, had a profound impact on how the Alliance would later define itself after the Cold War. Since the Alliance first intervened in the former Yugoslavia, NATO has changed so drastically that it is nearly unrecognizable.

In retrospect, it makes sense for the Alliance to extend its authority into crisis management in addition to collective defense. However, this was extremely divisive and caused fervent discussion inside the Alliance throughout the first half of the 1990s. Even in the early stages of IFOR, many Allies were worried about the possibility of "mission creep," which is the propensity to take on increasing amounts of duties that are deemed to be best handled by civilian actors. But it soon became clear that victory in battle could not be accomplished in a vacuum. It will be seen as a failure of NATO as well as civic groups if the entire peace-building effort falls short of creating the conditions for a stable and lasting peace. This aided in the creation of a strategy for civil-military collaboration as well as the strengthening of connections between the peacekeeping force and its civilian

counterparts. By the time KFOR deployed in 1999, these lessons had been learned, and the force's wide mandate reflected them right away.

Over the past 28 years, primarily as a result of hostilities sparked by the breakup of Yugoslavia, NATO's capabilities and expertise in handling difficult peace-support operations have significantly increased. Furthermore, opinions about activities outside Alliance borders and even outside the Euro-Atlantic region have changed. NATO intervened militarily in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* in 2001 at Skopje's request to stop an escalating conflict from turning into a full-fledged civil war, whereas it took nearly three and a half years of bloodshed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a year of fighting in Kosovo for NATO to end these conflicts. As in Afghanistan, NATO is in fact expanding its deployments in support of the larger goals of the international community to help solve ingrained issues and provide the conditions for various peace processes to become self-sustaining.

4.4. Case Studies

4.4.1. Yugoslav Wars

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was one of the largest, most developed and diverse countries in the Balkans. It was a non-aligned federation of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. In addition to the six republics, the two separate regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina held the status of autonomous provinces within the Republic of Serbia. Yugoslavia was a mix of ethnic groups and religions, with Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism and Islam being the main religions.

Coinciding with the collapse of communism and resurgent nationalism in Eastern Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Yugoslavia experienced a period of intense political and economic crisis. Central government weakened while militant nationalism grew apace. There was a proliferation of political parties who, on one side, advocated the outright independence of republics and, on the other, urged greater powers for certain republics within the federation.

Political leaders used nationalist rhetoric to erode a common Yugoslav identity and fuel fear and mistrust among different ethnic groups. By 1991, the break-up of the country loomed with Slovenia and Croatia blaming Serbia of unjustly dominating Yugoslavia's government, military and finances. Serbia in turn accused the two republics of separatism.

4.4.1.1. Slovenia - 1991

The first of the six republics to formally leave Yugoslavia was Slovenia, declaring independence on 25 June 1991. This triggered an intervention of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) which turned into a brief military conflict, generally referred to as the Ten-Day War. It ended in a victory of the Slovenian forces, with the JNA withdrawing its soldiers and equipment.

4.4.1.2. Croatia - 1991-1995

Croatia declared independence on the same day as Slovenia. But while Slovenia's withdrawal from the Yugoslav Federation was comparatively bloodless, Croatia's was not to be. The sizeable ethnic Serb minority in Croatia openly rejected the authority of the newly proclaimed Croatian state citing the right to remain within Yugoslavia. With the help of the JNA and Serbia, Croatian Serbs rebelled, declaring nearly a third of Croatia's territory under their control to be an independent Serb state. Croats and other non-Serbs were expelled from

its territory in a violent campaign of ethnic cleansing. Heavy fighting in the second half of 1991 witnessed the shelling of the ancient city of Dubrovnik, and the siege and destruction of Vukovar by Serb forces.

Despite the UN-monitored ceasefire which came into force in early 1992, Croatian authorities were determined to assert authority over their territory, and used its resources to develop and equip its armed forces. In the summer of 1995, the Croatian military undertook two major offensives to regain all but a pocket of its territory known as Eastern Slavonia. In a major exodus, tens of thousands of Serbs fled the Croatian advance to Serb-held areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and further to Serbia. The war in Croatia effectively ended in the fall of 1995. Croatia eventually re-asserted its authority over the entire territory, with Eastern Slavonia reverting to its rule in January 1998 following a peaceful transition under UN-administration.

4.4.1.3. Bosnia and Herzegovina-1992-1995

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the conflict was to be the deadliest of all in the disintegrating Yugoslav Federation. This central Yugoslav republic had a shared government reflecting the mixed ethnic composition with the population made up of about 43 per cent Bosnian Muslims, 33 per cent Bosnian Serbs, 17 per cent Bosnian Croats and some seven percent of other nationalities. The republic's strategic position made it subject to both Serbia and Croatia attempting to assert dominance over large chunks of its territory. In fact, the leaders of Croatia and Serbia had in 1991 already met in a secret meeting where they agreed to divide up Bosnia and Herzegovina, leaving a small enclave for Muslims.

In March 1992, in a referendum boycotted by Bosnian Serbs, more than 60 percent of Bosnian citizens voted for independence. Almost immediately, in April 1992, Bosnian Serbs rebelled with the support of the Yugoslav People's Army and Serbia, declaring the territories

under their control to be a Serb republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through overwhelming military superiority and a systematic campaign of persecution of non-Serbs, they quickly asserted control over more than 60% of the country. Bosnian Croats soon followed, rejecting the authority of the Bosnian Government and declaring their own republic with the backing of Croatia. The conflict turned into a bloody three-sided fight for territories, with civilians of all ethnicities becoming victims of horrendous crimes.

It is estimated that more than 100,000 people were killed and two million people, more than half the population, were forced to flee their homes as a result of the war that raged from April 1992 through to November 1995 when a peace deal was initialled in Dayton. Thousands of Bosnian women were systematically raped. Notorious detention centres for civilians were set up by all conflicting sides: in Prijedor, Omarska, Konjic, Dretelj and other locations. The single worst atrocity of the war occurred in the summer of 1995 when the Bosnian town of Srebrenica, a UN-declared safe area, came under attack by forces lead by the Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladić. During a few days in early July, more than 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were executed by Serb forces in an act of genocide. The rest of the town's women and children were driven out.

4.4.1.4. Kosovo - 1998-1999

The next area of conflict was centered on Kosovo, where the ethnic Albanian community there sought independence from Serbia. In 1998 violence flared as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) came out in open rebellion against Serbian rule, and police and army reinforcements were sent in to crush the insurgents.

In their campaign, the Serb forces heavily targeted civilians, shelling villages and forcing Kosovo Albanians to flee. As the attempt at an internationally-brokered deal to end the crisis failed in early 1999 at the Rambouillet peace talks, NATO carried out a 78-day-long

campaign of air strikes against targets in Kosovo and Serbia. In response, Serb forces further intensified the persecution of the Kosovo Albanian civilians. Ultimately, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević agreed to withdraw his troops and police from the province. Some 750,000 Albanian refugees came home and about 100,000 Serbs - roughly half the province's Serb population – fled in fear of reprisals. In June 1999, Serbia agreed to international administration of Kosovo with the final status of the province still unresolved.

4.4.1.5. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - 2001

The southernmost republic of the Yugoslav Federation, Macedonia, declared independence in the fall of 1991 and enjoyed a peaceful separation. It was later admitted to the UN under the temporary name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, populated by a majority of ethnic Macedonians and a large Albanian minority, remained at peace through the Yugoslav wars of the early 1990s. However, at the beginning of January 2001 the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) militant group clashed with the republic's security forces with the aim of obtaining autonomy or independence for the Albanian-populated areas in the country. Sporadic armed conflict lasted for several months in 2001, ending with a peace deal which envisaged a political agreement on power-sharing, the disarmament of the Albanian militia and the deployment of a NATO monitoring force.

4.4.2. Political Transition in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia

Changes in the international arena led to significant breaks in states' domestic policies and political lives. During the Cold War, the influence and interventions of the Soviet Union in Eastern and Central Europe were in question. The democratization processes that started after the collapse of socialism in Central and Eastern Europe had difficulties reflecting the

political culture-based transformations of the historical heritage. This is because both in Europe and the former Eastern Bloc countries, the transition of democracy and the Western identity creation model were worn as large/small size clothes for these countries. The influence of the Soviet Union in Hungary and Poland between 1945 and 1990, when the bipolar system divided the world into two ideological poles, is remarkable. These two countries experienced similar processes within the same ideological group and followed similar democratization movements after the end of the bipolar system. In addition, when the imperial histories of Hungary and Poland are considered, Eastern influence can be seen more clearly in the system instead of a Western affiliation. Remarkably, these two countries followed democratization movements after the Cold War period and the end of the bipolar system.

Hungary and Poland, the two European countries of the Eastern bloc, have started to take essential steps toward joining North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) since the 1990s. These two countries became EU members in 2004, during the EU's fifth enlargement round. In this respect, the examples of Poland and Hungary can be seen as successful examples for the West in the first stage. However, the institutional results revealed in these states lead us to question their success regarding democratic transformation. This acceptance means that the adoption of articles initiated for the first time following the end of the Cold War within the scope of the 1992 EU values and strengthened the respect for the rule of law, democracy, and fundamental rights.

Today, the Hungarian and Polish governments are often criticized for failing to meet democratic standards (Holesch & Kyriazi, 2021). Although the questioning of democracy in Poland and Hungary is called "democratic backsliding," it is seen as an essential place to understand this situation with a domestic conceptualization. This situation is interpreted as the illiberal democracy process throughout the world. After 2007, it was seen that some

countries in Central Europe acted in this way. Along with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland remained a little far from the goals of Euro-Atlantic integration in this process (Kubas, 2020). In this respect, within the scope of the study, the democratization steps taken in the post-Cold War period through the examples of Hungary and Poland will be called “military democracies.” The steps taken in the name of democratization and democratization processes can move back and forth quickly, just like in the Mehter march. However, this situation may not reflect a process in which democracy ends or declines. On the contrary, it can help to internalize democracy in different ways. As a result, every country’s democracy or modernization tendencies are not the same.

4.5. NATO’s Responses

4.5.1. Delayed Response in Yugoslavia

On 9 June 1999, an agreement was signed that ended eleven weeks of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and which was to bring peace to the region, at least for now. This is the latest in a series of agreements negotiated since October 1998 and, with NATO and UN support, one that might hold. However, ensuring that peace ultimately will require the deployment of approximately 55,000 troops, bringing to more than 80,000 the number of NATO troops in the Balkans.

The decision to bomb Yugoslavia in March 1999 was made just as the alliance was preparing to celebrate its 50th anniversary by admitting new members, and was concurrent with the release of the 1999 "Alliance's Strategic Concept." Building on the Strategic Concept agreed upon in Rome in 1991, the 1999 version reinforces the notion that, if it is to endure as a vital organization, NATO must be prepared to address and respond to a new range of threats and contribute to "peace and stability" in the region, as well as continue its primary mission of the defense of its members as outlined in Article 5 of the NATO Charter. Despite the outline of a strategic concept that was designed in 1991 to meet the challenges of the

post-Cold War world, the outbreak of conflict in the former Yugoslavia -- first in Croatia, then Bosnia-Herzegovina and most recently Kosovo -- provided a clear and direct challenge to those alliance goals.

As of July 1999, in the wake of the peace agreement, NATO was celebrating the fact that in Kosovo the alliance acted decisively. In addition, despite disagreements about the wisdom of the bombings, once decisions were made the unanimous conclusion seems to be that alliance cohesion was maintained. However, as the events in the former Yugoslavia illustrate, as NATO celebrated its 50th anniversary this April and now looks toward its future, it also needs to reexamine its post-Cold War role. While the discussion of the future of the alliance after the Cold War has been part of ongoing NATO ministerial summits, the alliance seems to have made little progress in staking out a new role for itself in a changing security environment. If NATO is to survive and even thrive, it is incumbent upon the organization to review the lessons of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and to draw some conclusions about what they mean for the alliance's future.

Lack of a clear mission and of leadership have contributed to drift, rather than direction, in spite of articulation of a "Strategic Concept." Taking this point one step further, this article will argue that the conflicts in Bosnia and more recently in Kosovo point out NATO's inability to deal with conflicts of this type at a time when ethnic and religious conflicts are among those the alliance is most likely to confront into the twenty-first century. It also asserts that the pattern observed in Kosovo and before that in Bosnia, characterized by the threat of force but with little activity that would make that threat credible, is part of a pattern that was established as early as 1992 when, for political reasons, the leaders of the NATO nations chose not to use force until later in that conflict as well. The lesson here is that politics drives the military/security aspects of the alliance.

4.5.2. Cooperation with Other International Organizations

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established by the Allies in December 1991 as a forum for dialogue and cooperation with NATO's former Warsaw Pact adversaries. The NACC was a manifestation of the "hand of friendship" extended at the July 1990 summit meeting in London, when Allied leaders proposed a new cooperative relationship with all countries in Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of the end of the Cold War.

The inaugural meeting of the NACC between Allies and non-NATO countries took place on 20 December 1991. As the final communiqué was being agreed, the Soviet ambassador announced that the Soviet Union had dissolved during the meeting and that he now only represented the Russian Federation. Such was the pace of change in Europe at the time.

The next day on 21 December 1991, the Alma-Ata Protocols were signed, formally ending the USSR and establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The 11 former Soviet republics of the newly formed CIS were invited to participate in the NACC. Georgia and Azerbaijan joined the NACC in 1992 along with Albania, and the Central Asian republics soon followed suit.

In the immediate post-Cold War period, consultations within the NACC focused on residual Cold War security concerns, such as the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States, and on regional conflicts that were breaking out in parts of the former Soviet Union as well as in the former Yugoslavia. The NACC also opened the door to political cooperation on a number of security and defence-related issues, as well as to military-to-military contacts and cooperation.

The NACC broke new ground in many ways. The multilateral political consultation and cooperation that it encouraged helped build confidence in the early 1990s, paving the way for the

launch of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994. The PfP programme offered participants the opportunity to develop practical bilateral cooperation with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation.

The invitation to join the PfP programme was addressed to all states participating in the NACC and other states participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (which in 1995 became the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe).

In 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council succeeded the NACC. This reflected the Allies' desire to build a security forum, which would include Western European partners and be better suited for the increasingly sophisticated relationships that were being developed with partners. For instance, by then, many had been deepening their cooperation with NATO, in particular in support of defence reform and the transition towards democracy, and by actively supporting the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4.5.3. Early Crisis Management Actions

Before turning to a discussion of NATO's new role in crisis management, it is worth recalling that crisis management as such is not new to NATO as during the Cold War it already had two roles in crisis management. 'Crisis management' for NATO during the Cold War was one dimension of its relationship with the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. It referred to the measures to be taken to prevent any conflict from becoming violent and the plans to bring it to a conclusion if it were to occur. In the Cold War NATO, as the focus for all its member states in dealing with the dominant problem of foreign and security policy facing them, had therefore a centrality both in the development of the political measures of conflict prevention as well as the planning for the military measures for concluding a crisis as quickly and satisfactorily as possible if it were to become violent. At a time when crises were

primarily seen as involving the two blocs. NATO, was seen as having an effective monopoly in Cold War crisis management, apart from possible bilateral super-power communications. ,

The second way in which NATO has played an effective, but much less public part, in crisis management, both during the Cold War and subsequently, has been in attempting to reconcile differences between its member states. The case to which most attention has been given over the years has been that of Greco-Turkish relations, but reference can also be made to discussions in the margins of ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council which helped to end the “Cod Wars” between the United Kingdom and Iceland in the 1970s. A great deal of time has been spent within various Alliance bodies on trying to deal with Greco-Turkish disputes, both insofar as they affected efficient Alliance military arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean and more directly to prevent conflicts between two members of the Alliance. Successive Secretaries General and Chairmen of the Military Committee have spent a great deal of time on this problem. Although they have been successful in preventing a deterioration of the relationship, almost certainly this still remains a problem of internal crisis management for the Alliance. NATO’s relatively unpublicised work in this field is a good illustration of the general principle that organisations rarely get credit for successful conflict prevention, it is only when conflict prevention fails that people notice.

4.5.4. Internal Divisions Within NATO

The key elements of NATO’s military organisation are the Military Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Defence of NATO member countries, its executive body – the International Military Staff – and the military Command Structure (distinct from the Force Structure).

The NATO Command Structure is composed of Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation, headed respectively by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation (SACT).

The Force Structure consists of organisational arrangements that bring together the forces placed at the Alliance's disposal by the member countries, along with their associated command and control structures. These forces are available for NATO operations in accordance with predetermined readiness criteria and with rules of deployment and transfer of authority to NATO command that can vary from country to country.

Working mechanisms

In practice, the Chair of the Military Committee presides over the Military Committee, where each member country has a military representative (or Milrep) for their Chief of Defence. This committee - NATO's most senior military authority - provides the North Atlantic Council and the Nuclear Planning Group with consensus-based military advice – that is, advice agreed to by all of NATO's Chiefs of Defence.

The Military Committee works closely with NATO's two Strategic Commanders – SACEUR, responsible for operations and SACT, responsible for transformation. They are both responsible to the Military Committee for the overall conduct of all Alliance military matters within their areas of responsibility.

On the one side, the Military Committee provides the Strategic Commanders with guidance on military matters; and on the other side, it works closely with them to bring forward for political consideration by the North Atlantic Council, military assessments, plans, issues and recommendations, together with an analysis that puts this information into a wider context and takes into account the concerns of each member country. The Military Committee is supported in this role by the International Military Staff.

In sum, the Military Committee serves, inter alia, as a link between the political leaders of NATO Headquarters and the two Strategic Commanders.

The capacity to adapt

Over and above these working mechanisms, there are two phenomena that have a direct impact on the military structure, the way it functions and the way it evolves: first and foremost, international developments and events; and secondly, the constant interaction between the political and military bodies.

Evidently, political events with far-reaching consequences such as the end of the Cold War and military operations such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO's former operation in Afghanistan – do trigger extensive reforms, especially within NATO's military Command Structure. To keep pace with all these changes and future challenges, the Command Structure and way of doing business are constantly evolving. Additionally, the permanent exchange of information and specialised knowledge as well as experience between military experts and the political actors at NATO Headquarters are a constant and continual means of mutual education. This ability of the military and the civilian to work closely together makes NATO a unique organisation.

5. Questions to be Addressed

1. How should NATO adapt accordingly with the new world order?
2. What should the new strategic concept consist of?
3. How can NATO maintain peace and stability in Europe after the dissolution of the Soviet Union?
4. How should NATO develop their relations with Eastern European countries?
5. Should expansion or stability be NATO's priority?
6. How can NATO strengthen cooperation with former Warsaw Pact states after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact?
7. Should NATO expand its role beyond collective defense in the post–Cold War period?
8. How should NATO adapt to the new security environment after the Cold War?
9. How should NATO respond to ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes in Eastern Europe?
10. What role should crisis management play in NATO's new Strategic Concept?
11. To what extent should NATO reduce conventional and nuclear forces in Europe?
12. How should NATO balance collective defense with diplomacy and cooperation?
13. What role should NATO play in preventing regional conflicts from spreading across Europe?

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